It is not unusual for a creditor of a debtor to cry foul that a non-debtor affiliate has substantial assets, but has not joined the bankruptcy. In some cases, the creditor may assert that even though its claim, on its face, is solely against the debtor, the debtor and the non-debtor conducted business as a single unit, or that the debtor indicated that the assets of the non-debtor were available to satisfy claims. In these circumstances, the creditor would like nothing more than to drag that asset-rich non-debtor into the bankruptcy to satisfy its claims. Is that possible?

There are numerous reasons why a company might use more than one entity for its operations or organization: to silo liabilities, for tax advantages, to accommodate a lender, or for general organizational purposes. Simply forming a separate entity, however, is not enough. Corporate formalities must be followed or a court could effectively collapse the separate entities into one. A recent opinion by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts, Lassman v.

It is a familiar scenario: a company is on the verge of bankruptcy, bound by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), and unable to negotiate a new agreement.  However, this time, an analysis of this distressed scenario prompted a new question: does it matter if the CBA is already expired, i.e., does the Bankruptcy Code distinguish between a CBA that expires pre-petition versus one that has not lapsed?

On Saturday, June 28, Puerto Rico’s Governor Padilla signed into effect Puerto Rico’s new bankruptcy law for certain revenue bond issuers.  Within 24 hours of the statute’s enactment, two mutual fund complexes owning approximately $1.7 billion in bonds of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) filed a complaint in the federal district court for Puerto Rico, seeking a declaratory judgment invalidating the fledgling legislation.

In a recent decision by the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, the court adopted a flexible approach to consensual third party releases in a plan of reorganization. In In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 384 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 31, 2013), the court permitted third party releases where creditors failed to opt out of the release provisions of the plan either by not submitting their vote on the plan, or by voting against the plan but failing to check the “opt out” box on the ballot.

Clients often raise questions concerning the enforceability of arbitration clauses in bankruptcy proceedings. While this topic has been hotly debated for many years, a recent Ninth Circuit opinion, In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 671 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2012), reminds us that arbitration clauses are not sacrosanct and can be struck down by the court.

As many are already aware, the City of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania filed a Chapter 9 bankruptcy late Tuesday evening, October 11 in advance of a Pennsylvania state senate vote that may have put the city on the path to a receivership.  The Chapter 9 petition (http://www.publicfinancematters.com/Harrisburg%20Petition%20.pdf) is the result of a 4-3 vote “authorizing” the filing by the Harrisburg city council without the support of Harrisburg’s Mayor Linda Thompson.  Pr

On June 4, 2014, the New York Court of Appeals will hear arguments arising from the bankruptcies of two law firms—Thelen and Coudert Brothers—as to whether the former partners of the bankrupt law firms must turn over profits earned on billable-hour client matters they brought to their new firms.

Buyers of assets through the bankruptcy court process seek comfort and solace in the entry of a sale order providing for the transfer of assets “free and clear” of all liabilities. Except for those liabilities expressly assumed by the buyer and new owner, the bankruptcy court order typically includes exacting and precise language transferring those assets, under the imprimatur of the United States Bankruptcy Court, free and clear of all liabilities.

Applying Georgia law, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia has voided a surplus lines policy on the grounds that the insured, a purported hedge fund management firm, concealed that it was operating a Ponzi scheme, submitted an inaccurate financial statement, and misrepresented that its investment funds were “stable.”Perkins v. Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 2012 WL 2105908 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Apr. 3, 2012).