Parties to an appeal who condition a settlement on the vacating of the lower court’s judgment “may still [have] an appropriate remedy,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on July 12, 2016. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Crum & Forster Specialty Ins. Co., 2016 U.S. App LEXIS 12813, *15 (11th Cir. July 12, 2016). Reversing the district court’s “narrow” refusal to vacate its judgment after the parties had settled, the Eleventh Circuit found that “exceptional circumstances” warranted the vacatur. Id., at *3, *14.

(7th Cir. July 26, 2016)

The Seventh Circuit interprets a Wisconsin exemption statute applicable to annuity contracts. The statute provides that such a contract is exempt from assets available to creditors so long as it “complies with the provisions of the internal revenue code.” The trustee argued for a narrow interpretation of this language, while the Court ultimately agrees with the broader interpretation of the statute employed by Wisconsin bankruptcy courts. Opinion below.

Judge: Hamilton

Attorney for Debtors: Dewitt Ross & Stevens S.C., Craig E. Stevenson

Second Circuit Court of Appeals Decision in GM Cases Casts a Shadow Over Whether Section 363 Sale Orders Insulate Buyers from Debtors’ Product Liability Claims.

The collapse of marine fuel trader OW Bunker & Trading A/S (“OW Bunker”) and its affiliates, in November 2014, has resulted in a blizzard of legal proceedings in the United States. Bunker suppliers and creditors of insolvent OW Bunker entities have sought to secure their claims by arresting vessels or proceeding directly against vessel owners and operators who contracted with OW Bunker entities to supply their vessels with bunkers.

You can "wind up" a partnership without having to liquidate all of its assets and terminating its existence. So ruled Judge McGuire last week in Hardin v. Lewis, 2016 NCBC 55. But that may not be true for all partnerships. This case involved a law firm partnership which was continuing to operate its practice after one of its partners left to start her own law firm.

Under Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor or trustee can sell estate assets “free and clear of any interest” in such assets. This short, simple string of six words represents one of the most powerful tools in the bankruptcy professional’s arsenal.

The scope of the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor for certain financial contracts has been tested again, this time in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Louisiana. The question this time was whether an ipso facto provision continues to be safe harbored if enforcement of that provision is conditioned on other factors – in this case, the debtor’s failure to perform under the contract.

Imagine a creditor filing a claim in a chapter 13 bankruptcy case where neither the debtor nor the bankruptcy trustee objects to the claim. Imagine the chapter 13 plan is confirmed, including the claimed debt, though the creditor receives little to nothing in return for its claim. Can the debtor later bring a separate action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act or does res judicata bar the FDCPA claim?

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently articulated a standard to determine what claims may be barred against a purchaser of assets "free and clear" of claims pursuant to section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code and highlighted procedural due process concerns with respect to enforcement.¹  The decision arose out of litigation regarding certain defects, including the well-known "ignition switch defect," affecting certain GM vehicles.  GM's successor (which acquired GM's assets in a section 363 sale in 2009) asserted that a "free and clear" provisi

The Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme provides that the shareholders generally cannot receive anything on account of their investment until all secured, priority and unsecured creditors are paid in full.