Recently, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that a carve-out provision in a DIP financing order did not act as an absolute limit on the fees and expenses payable to the professionals retained by an unsecured creditors’ committee (the “Committee”). Rather, in In re Molycorp, Inc., 562 B.R. 67 (Bankr. D. Del.
On February 21, 2017, Judge Silverstein of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court issued an opinion (the “Opinion”) in the Outer Harbor Terminal bankruptcy proceeding – Bankr. D. Del., Case 16-10283. The Opinion is available here. This Opinion decided the Debtor’s objection to a claim for breach of contract filed by Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd. (“K Line”).
The oil and gas crisis produced yet another curious set of circumstances and a decision addressing the applicability of the automatic stay to an action against a principal of the debtor. In Luppino v. York, Case No. 16-00409-XR (W.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2016) (D.I.
(S.D. Ind. Feb. 13, 2017)
State and federal laws provide numerous protections to secured parties to preserve their interests in collateral. As secured parties well know, however, these protections become more and more limited when the collateral is pledged to multiple secured parties. Issues, like priority of interests and liens, become more prevalent when the collateral at issue falls in value and multiple secured parties are fighting to enforce their interests in order to satisfy their debts.
Recently, in a split (2-1) decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York’s decision in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance Corp., 111 F. Supp.3d 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Marblegate II”). The Second Circuit held in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance Corp., No. 15-2124, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 782 (2d Cir. Jan.
(Bankr. S.D. Ind. Feb. 10, 2017)
The bankruptcy court enters judgment in favor of the debtor on the trustee’s claims to avoid transfers of real property, but the court enters judgment in favor of the trustee on the claim under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4) and denies the debtor a discharge. The court finds that the debtor made a false oath on his statement of financial affairs with reckless disregard for the truth. The debtor had transferred property prior to his divorce but claimed those transfers were made as a result of the divorce. Opinion below.
Judge: Moberly
Downtown Redevelopment Districts
On January 17, 2017, a divided (2-1) panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Second Circuit) reversed the decision of the District Court for the Southern District of New York (Southern District) in the Marblegate litigation1 (Marblegate) with respect to the interpretation of Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA).
Recoupment is an equitable remedy – not expressly addressed in the Bankruptcy Code – that permits the offset of mutual debts arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. Unlike typical setoff, if recoupment applies, prepetition debts can be set off against postpetition debts. A recent decision from the Delaware bankruptcy court demonstrates that the availability of recoupment often depends on how the court defines the contours of the “same transaction or occurrence” requirement.