Last week, President Trump unveiled his proposal to fix our nation’s aging infrastructure. While the proposal lauded $1.5 trillion in new spending, it only included $200 billion in federal funding. To bridge this sizable gap, the plan largely relies on public private partnerships (often referred to as P3s) that can use tax-exempt bond financing.
The Circuit Courts of Appeal have split on whether a prepetition transfer made by a debtor is avoidable if the transfer was made through a financial intermediary that was a mere conduit. Today, the Supreme Court unanimously resolved the split by deciding that transfers through “mere conduits” are not protected. This is a major (and adverse) decision for lenders, bondholders and noteholders who receive payments through an intermediary such as a disbursing agent.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania recently affirmed a trial court’s order granting a title insurance company summary judgment based on a defect that a survey of the premises would have shown. SeeKreider v. Correia, 2018 WL 359285 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2018). In the case, the plaintiff insured purchased a property after the lender had obtained it via a foreclosure (the “Property”). Before plaintiff purchased it, the real estate agent informed him that the Property included a two-car garage and some other surrounding land.
Section 1141(d)(6)(A) and section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code together provide that debts owed by a corporation to a government entity are not dischargeable if such debts were obtained by false representations. Does this rule apply to claims by government entities seeking to enforce consumer fraud laws, where the government entities were not themselves the victims of the fraud?
The Department of Education (the “Department”) has formally sought comment on the legal standards used to evaluate whether a borrower has established “undue hardship” to discharge his or her student loans in a bankruptcy proceeding. The Department published this request for information in the Federal Register last Wednesday and responses to the request for will be taken through May 22, 2018.
Bankruptcy Code—Section 546(e) Safe Harbor
Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., No. 16-784
Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., No. 16-784 (2018)
On February 27, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a ruling that will make it easier for bankruptcy trustees, creditors’ committees, and other bankruptcy estate representatives to claw back payments made to shareholders in leveraged buyouts and dividend recapitalizations.
Constructive Fraudulent Transfer Claims and the Securities Safe Harbor
February 25, 2018
Treasury Issues Report on Dodd-Frank Orderly Liquidation Authority
Treasury Issues Report Recommending Adoption of Reforms to Dodd-Frank Orderly Liquidation Authority and a New Chapter 14 of the Bankruptcy Code for Significantly Systemic Financial Companies
SUMMARY
Judge Swain’s decision in the PROMESA Title III bankruptcy proceeding of the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (“PRHTA”) that a federal bankruptcy court cannot compel a municipal debtor to apply special revenues to post-petition debt service payments on special revenue bonds has generated controversy and caused some market participants to question whether, if the decision is upheld by the First Circuit on appeal, the perception that special revenue bonds have special rights in bankruptcy remains justified.