Under the “American Rule” concerning the recovery of attorney’s fees in pursuing breach of contract litigation, the prevailing party is awarded fees if the contract or an applicable statute provides for such recovery. Some states also allow a judgment creditor to recover fees incurred in enforcing the judgment, if the judgment was based on a contract or statute that authorized fees in the original litigation. See, e.g., California Code of Civil Procedure § 685.040.

A known creditor, which was aware of a debtor’s pending bankruptcy but did not receive legally required notice of the debtor’s chapter 11 case, was not barred from bringing a state action following bankruptcy discharge.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that actual knowledge of the pending chapter 11 case did not satisfy due process requirements; therefore, the known creditor’s subsequent claim was not barred by the debtor’s discharge injunction. Arch Wireless, Inc. v. Nationwide Paging, Inc. (In re Arch Wireless, Inc.), 534 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2008).

C.A. No. 3017-CC (Del. Ch. May 15, 2009)

On May 15, 2009, Chancellor Chandler issued a four-page order in Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, et al. addressing a motion for injunction or stay of the judicial dissolution of Genetrix, LLC pending appeal by Dr. Andrew Segal. Segal was appealing the January 13, 2009 Memorandum Opinion and the March 10, 2009 Order and decree of judicial dissolution of Genitrix, LLC.

Introduction

On March 30, 2009, the United States Supreme Court heard oral argument in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Bailey,1 a case that addresses the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts to authorize third-party releases in the context of a debtor’s plan of reorganization.

Only twice has the U.S. Supreme Court spoken directly to environmental issues in bankruptcy – until now. Today the Supreme Court ruled that certain claims can in fact be barred by a bankruptcy court's channeling injunction. The case is particularly important in light of the major corporate bankruptcies now under way in the industrial sector, where environmental costs can drive the success or failure of a restructuring.

Last week, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Bailey,2 establishing an important precedent concerning the ability of bankruptcy courts to release claims against third party non-debtors in chapter 11 plans of reorganization. In the June 2009 issue of Cadwalader’s Restructuring Review newsletter, we introduced this case and considered the potential implications of a ruling on this important but unsettled topic.

In U.S. v. Apex Oil, a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit ruled 3-0 that EPA’s cleanup injunction against the corporate successor to a chemical company was not discharged in Chapter 11 because the injunction does not create a right to payment and, consequently, is not a ‘debt’ under the Bankruptcy Code.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently prohibited insurers from terminating debtors' insurance contracts based on so-called "cesser" clauses, which provided for the automatic termination of insurance coverage upon the commencement of proceedings under any bankruptcy or insolvency law. LaMonica v. N. of Eng. Protecting & Indem. Ass'n Ltd. (In re Probulk Inc.), 407 B.R. 56 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).

The U.S. Supreme Court has issued a long-awaited decision that many practitioners had hoped would provide insight into the permissible breadth of third-party releases and injunctions often contained in confirmed chapter 11 plans. The high court, however, narrowly resolved the issue presented in Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 129 S.Ct. 2195 (2009), and left open that ultimate question.

The US government’s foray into restructuring the ailing US automotive industry has been widely reported in the media and represents the most substantial federal intervention in the private business sector since the Great Depression. In Chrysler’s case, the government took the unprecedented step of orchestrating a “surgical” Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing with the primary goal of utilizing the provisions of Section 363 of the US Bankruptcy Code to sell substantially all of Chrysler’s assets to “New Chrysler” in less than 30 days.