The Illinois Supreme Court recently provided certainty to dissolving corporations with respect to the risk of facing a lawsuit even after it has long since dissolved. Illinois permits lawsuits against dissolved corporations for up to five years after the corporation has ceased to exist. The Supreme Court clarified that only those claims that have accrued prior to the corporation's dissolution (i.e., the injury occurred prior to dissolution) may be brought in that five-year period.
FCStone, a New York-based commodities brokerage firm, was recently ordered to return a transfer of $15.6 million to the bankruptcy estate of Sentinel Management Group. Approximately $1.1 million of this amount constituted a prepetition transfer of proceeds the debtor obtained from the sale of securities, which proceeds the debtor distributed to a certain segment of its customers, including FCStone.
In a ruling on February 28, 2013, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois reversed the February 29, 2012 order of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Illinois allowing a bankruptcy trustee to avoid an Illinois mortgage as to unsecured creditors for lack of “constructive notice” because the mortgage did not expressly state the maturity date of and interest rate on the underlying debt (In Re Crane, Case 12-2146, U.S. Dist. Ct., C.D. IL, February 28, 2013).
The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois has arguably driven the last nail into the coffin of In re Crane, the much criticized decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Illinois. The coffin was already set in place after the Illinois legislature passed S.B.0016 late last year, which was signed into law by Gov.
Custom and practice in Illinois with respect to mortgages has been to incorporate the note or other debt instrument by reference, rather than to disclose all of the financial terms of a loan transaction in the mortgage.
On January 4, 2013, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois issued an opinion that strikes a significant blow against the rights of futures customers that might otherwise enjoy the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor protections. The opinion, arising out of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case of Sentinel Management Group, Inc. (Sentinel), fashions a new exception to the safe harbor protections in the event of distributions or redemptions to customers of a failed futures commission merchant (FCM).
Since theIn re Crane decision was handed down by the Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Illinois in April 2012, all eyes in the mortgage banking industry have been focused on the appeal of the decision pending in the U.S. District Court, in the hopes that the widely criticized ruling of the Bankruptcy Court would be overruled.
The Illinois legislature has passed and sent to the Governor an amendment to the Illinois Conveyances Act to address the decision in Crane v. The Gifford State Bank (2012 WL 669595 (Bkrtcy.C.D. Il). The Crane decision was rendered on February 29, 2012, and held that a mortgage could be avoided by a trustee in bankruptcy because it failed to include the interest rate and maturity date of the indebtedness secured by the mortgage.
In a case originating out of bankruptcy court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s finding that a perpetual, royalty free, assignable, transferable, exclusive license granted as part of the sale of the business operations, assets and intellectual property associated with two bread baking brands was an executory contract. Lewis Bros. Bakeries Inc. v. Interstate Brands Corp., Case No. 11-1850 (8th Cir., Aug. 30, 2012) (Bye, J.).
In a fairly controversial decision from January 2012, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Illinois held that a financing statement must contain the “legal” name of an individual as it appears on the individual’s birth certificate. Miller v. State Bank of Arthur (In re Miller), Adv. P. No. 11-9055 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2012). On appeal, the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois reversed and held that the Uniform Commercial Code requires only that a “correct” name appear on the financing statement.