Recent technological innovations and advancements in drilling and completion techniques have led to an unprecedented expansion of natural gas production by large and midsize exploration and production companies. This expansion created competition for wild cat acreage as well as producing properties, putting lessors and co-owners (the “non-operators”) at a distinct advantage in negotiating the terms of leases, farmout agreements and joint operating agreements (“JOAs”).
The Issue
The issue is whether the insolvency of a borrower under a non-recourse loan can trigger recourse liability for itself and its “bad boy,” non-recourse carve-out guarantors.
In what it described as “an easy decision,” the U.S. Supreme Court issued its eagerly anticipated decision in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC et al. v. Amalgamated Bank1 on May 29, 2012.
Buying natural gas assets from financially distressed companies is an inherently risky proposition. Even when an attractive prospect is identified, the purchaser has to overcome a number of issues such as clearing up title, including mechanic and materialman liens and getting assignments of contracts and lessor consents. Assuming these hurdles can be managed, the purchaser is also faced with legacy liability problems ranging from plugging and abandonment and decommissioning costs, unknown claims from interest owners under joint operating agreements, general claims from oil field
Technological innovation has changed the landscape of domestic natural gas production from shortage to surplus. The result: a glut of natural gas and historically low prices. While many producers have successfully hedged against this risk to date, as older hedges roll off, many companies are unable to obtain replacement hedges at attractive prices. Some have even resorted to monetizing their in-the-money hedges to raise capital today (and borrowing against the future).
The Issue
The issue is whether a Chapter 11 plan can be crammed down over the secured lender’s objection where the plan provides for the sale or transfer of the secured lender’s collateral with the proceeds going to the secured lender without the secured lender having the right to credit bid for is collateral up to the full amount of its claim.
Can a U.S. patent licensee whose license has been rejected by a licensor under foreign law in a foreign bankruptcy rely on the protections of § 365(n) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code? On October 28, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia issued an opinion addressing this in the Chapter 15 case of Qimonda AG (“Qimonda”).5 The bankruptcy court held that the application of § 365(n) to executory licenses to U.S. patents was required to sufficiently protect the interests of U.S.
On October 28, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia issued an opinion in the Chapter 15 case of Qimonda AG (“Qimonda”).1 The bankruptcy court held that the application of § 365(n) to executory licenses to U.S. patents was required to sufficiently protect the interests of U.S. patent licensees under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code and that the failure of German insolvency law to protect patent licensees was “manifestly contrary” to United States public policy.
Rejection of a contract in bankruptcy may not always accomplish a debtor’s goal to shed ongoing contractual obligations and liabilities, especially when dealing with employee benefit plans. On October 13, 2011, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals highlighted this issue in its opinion in Evans v. Sterling Chemicals, Inc.1 regarding the treatment of a pre-bankruptcy asset purchase agreement which contained a provision addressing the debtor-acquiror’s post-closing ERISA retiree benefit plan obligations to its new employees resulting from the transaction.
Bankruptcy Judge Michael Lynn of the Northern District of Texas recently issued a noteworthy opinion in In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P. that addresses two important Chapter 11 confirmation issues. Judge Lynn determined that a plan that artificially impaired a class of claims in order to meet the requirements of section 1129(a)(10) had not been proposed in bad faith and did not violate the requirements of section 1129(a). In his ruling, Judge Lynn also applied the Supreme Court’s cram-down “interest”1 rate teachings in Till v.