The waiver of Solicitor/Client privilege by a bankrupt company is a difficult matter and one distinct from the waiver of such privilege by an individual bankrupt. As there is nothing in the BIA that either gives or denies a trustee the right to waive solicitor/client privilege on behalf of a company,Hahaha yes with a lot of candles! the courts have had to turn to the common law for guidance on the issue.
TheBankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c. B‐3 (the “BIA”) was recently amended to repeal the settlement and reviewable transaction sections of the Act, and replaced these sections with provisions regarding transfers under value and preferences. The aim of these new provisions is to prevent bankrupts from unfairly preferring certain creditors over others and to prevent bankrupts from transferring assets for significantly less than they are worth.
The Supreme Court in McIntosh v Fisk upheld the Court of Appeal decision permitting the liquidators of Ross Asset Management Ltd (RAM) to claw back the fictitious profits paid out to Mr McIntosh. However the claw back did not apply to the original investment of $500,000.
The majority found that McIntosh had a defence for the $500,000 as he had provided "real and substantial valuable consideration". Once RAM misappropriated the $500,000 it became indebted to McIntosh for that amount, this equated to the provision of valuable consideration.
James Developments Limited (JDL) went into liquidation on 6 July 2009.
In November 2012, the liquidator issued proceedings against a trust for repayment of a loan, six years and one month after the loan was made. The trustees argued the claim was time-barred. The liquidator argued there had been a fraudulent cover-up of the loan and that the High Court should postpone the limitation period under section 28 of the Limitation Act 1950 (Act).
Mr and Ms Moncur were the sole directors and effective owners of Monocrane NZ (Monocrane). Following their separation, they entered into a relationship property agreement under which Mr Moncur assumed full ownership and control of Monocrane, including agreeing to assume sole responsibility for the overdrawn shareholders' current account. In return, Ms Moncur agreed to resign her directorship, transfer her shares to Mr Moncur and pay various joint debts.
In the recent decision in Taylor v Official Assignee, the Court of Appeal overturned the High Court's dismissal of Mrs Taylor's appeal against the Official Assignee's decisions to set aside dispositions by Mrs Taylor to her family trust prior to her bankruptcy.
Mr and Mrs Taylor settled the family trust in October 2000. The dispositions in question occurred between December 2000 and January 2007. Mrs Taylor was adjudicated bankrupt in November 2006.
Mr Petricevic is the former director of Bridgecorp and currently faces criminal charges of fraud that carry with them the possibility of a maximum of 49 years in prison.
Husky Int’l Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, No. 15-145
Debtors seek the protections of the Bankruptcy Code to have their debts discharged, but there are exceptions. A creditor can prohibit discharge of a debt “obtained by … actual fraud.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). Today, in a 7-1 decision written by Justice Sotomayor, the Supreme Court ruled that a fraudulent conveyance qualifies as “actual fraud.”
Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, No. 15-145
On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (the “Circuit Court”) issued an opinion in In re TOUSA, Inc.,1 in which it affirmed the original decision of the bankruptcy court and reversed the appellate decision of the district court. After a 13-day trial, the bankruptcy court had found that liens granted by certain TOUSA subsidiaries (the “Conveying Subsidiaries”) to secure new loans (the “New Term Loans”) incurred to pay off preexisting indebtedness to certain lenders (the “Transeastern Lenders”) were avoidable fraudulent transfers.