The Bottom Line:

The Bottom Line:

The Bottom Line:

The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (“WARN”) requires an employer to give 60 days’ advance written notice prior to a plant closing or mass layoff. Frequently, as a company encounters financial distress—a situation that often leads to a plant closing or mass layoff— creditors exercise greater control over the entity in an attempt to recover debts owed to them. When the faltering company fails to provide the requisite WARN notice, terminated employees often assert that WARN liability should attach to such creditors. In Coppola v. Bear, Stearns & Co.

District Court decides that in a broker-dealer liquidation governed by SIPA, where a trustee seeks to recover funds paid to the defendant under Sections 548(a) and 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which impose liability for fraudulent conveyances where the defendant lacked good faith in receiving the funds: (i) the defendant’s good faith is evaluated under a subjective willful blindness standard, and (ii) to survive a motion to dismiss, the trustee bringing the fraudulent conveyance claims must plead facts sufficient to establish the defendant’s lack of good faith.

In the summer of 2007, we reported on Gredd v. Bear, Stearns Securities Corp. (In re Manhattan Investment Fund, Ltd.),1 decided by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York.

In Motorola, Inc. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007), the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”) and the debtors’ lenders sought approval of a settlement prior to confirmation of a plan of reorganization. While the Court concluded that many aspects of the settlement might otherwise be approved, it found that a provision that distributed funds in violation of the absolute priority rule lacked sufficient justification.

While the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provision in section 546(e) previously provided comfort for brokerdealers, the Bankruptcy Court’s decision in Gredd v. Bear, Stearns Securities Corp. (In re Manhattan Investment Fund, Ltd.), 359 B.R. 510 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), chips away at this provision and creates new risks for those providing brokerage account services. Always at risk as a deep pocket, new duties have been thrust upon brokerdealers that go far beyond the terms of the account agreement.

Factual Background

On April 19, 2012, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York granted in part and denied in part JPMorgan Chase, N.A.’s motion to dismiss an adversary complaint filed by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI”) and its Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors. The Complaint seeks to recover approximately $8.6 billion in prepetition transfers made by LBHI to JPMorgan in the days leading up to LBHI’s bankruptcy.

As the economy boomed in 2005-2007 and leverage increased to staggering levels, LBOs took a prominent place in the deal economy. During that time, investors completed 313 LBOs in the United States for approximately $630 billion.1 Following the recent economic downturn, many of those LBOs have become sources of controversy in a number of bankruptcies and restructurings - prominent examples include Tribune Co. and Lyondell Chemical Co.