In the recent case of BTI 2014 LLC v Sequana SA & others [2016] EWHC 1686, the High Court has held for the first time that a dividend can be challenged as a transaction entered into at an undervalue within the meaning of section 423(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the “IA”).

The Facts

The facts of the case are long and complex but for present purposes the pertinent facts are as follows.

Arjo Wiggins Appleton Limited (now Windward Prospects Limited) (“AWA”) was a wholly owned subsidiary of Sequana SA (“SSA”).

Although the bankruptcy world has long been acquainted with Ponzi schemes, the courts have not clearly answered the question of how to distribute investors’ funds after a scheme fails – especially in the scenario where certain investors profit. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah recently weighed in on the issue in 

The extent of a transferee’s knowledge in the context of fraudulent transfer claims under the Bankruptcy Code has been a frequent topic of discussion on the Weil Bankruptcy Blog.

The equitable theory of veil piercing, intended to serve as a rectifying mechanism against certain fraud, dishonesty or wrongdoing, is of particular import in the bankruptcy context given that it is an attractive remedy for a creditor of an insolvent company hoping to obtain a greater recovery on its claim. State law governs veil piercing claims and sets forth the hurdles a party must overcome in order to persuade the bankruptcy court that the debtor’s corporate formalities should be ignored.

As we’ve noted on several occasions, parties in interest in a bankruptcy case generally hope for “big money – no whammies” (“

Confirmation of a chapter 11 plan providing for the reorganization or liquidation of a debtor is the culmination of the chapter 11 process. To promote the fundamental policy of finality in that process, the general rule is that a final confirmation order is inviolable. The absence of certainty that the transactions effectuated under a plan are valid and permanent would undermine chapter 11’s fundamental purpose as a vehicle for rehabilitating ailing enterprises and providing debtors with a fresh start.

In relation to insolvent liquidations under U.K. law, one of the primary objectives will be the implementation of an efficient process to preserve and recover assets for the benefit of the creditors. This is particularly so where there is a need to instigate costly litigation or cross-border recognition proceedings and where the liquidator will want increased assurances as to the likelihood that those steps will generate positive returns.

"Safe harbors" in the Bankruptcy Code designed to insulate nondebtor parties to financial contracts from the consequences that normally ensue when a counterparty files for bankruptcy have been the focus of a considerable amount of scrutiny as part of evolving developments in the Great Recession. One of the most recent developments concerning this issue in the courts was the subject of a ruling handed down by the New York bankruptcy court presiding over the Lehman Brothers chapter 11 cases. In In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., Judge James M.

A fundamental premise of chapter 11 is that a debtor’s prebankruptcy management is presumed to provide the most capable and dedicated leadership for the company and should be allowed to continue operating the company’s business and managing its assets in bankruptcy while devising a viable business plan or other workable exit strategy. The chapter 11 “debtor-in-possession” (“DIP ”) is a concept rooted strongly in modern U.S. bankruptcy jurisprudence. Still, the presumption can be overcome.

In previous editions of the Business Restructuring Review, we reported on a pair of highly controversial rulings handed down in late 2005 and early 2006 by the New York bankruptcy court overseeing the chapter 11 cases of embattled energy broker Enron Corporation and its affiliates. In the first, Bankruptcy Judge Arthur J. Gonzalez held that a claim is subject to equitable subordination under section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code even if it is assigned to a third-party transferee who was not involved in any misconduct committed by the original holder of the debt.