The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently held that a borrower is not entitled to attorney’s fees under the Pennsylvania Loan Interest Law (“Act 6”) relating to an affirmative defense raised in a mortgage foreclosure action that was subsequently discontinued without prejudice.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a party with a pecuniary interest affected by a bankruptcy court order satisfies the “person aggrieved” requirement for appellate standing even where the party fails to appear and object in the bankruptcy proceeding.
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the appeal for lack of standing and remanded the case.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin recently held that claim preclusion does not bar a mortgagee from proceeding with a foreclosure complaint despite a prior litigation which resulted in a dismissal with prejudice if the subsequent litigation is based upon a default and acceleration which occurred after the initial foreclosure proceeding.
The District Court of Appeal for the Fifth District of Florida recently denied a motion to reconsider an order awarding appellate attorney’s fees to borrowers who were the prevailing party on appeal, reversing judgment of foreclosure entered in favor of the mortgagee.
The Supreme Court of New York, Suffolk County, recently granted a foreclosing plaintiff summary judgment and held that plaintiff did not need to send a 90-day notice pursuant to RPAPL 1304 because plaintiff was not a lender, assignee, or mortgage loan servicer. SeeNIC Holding Corp. v. Eisenegger, 59 Misc. 3d 1221(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018). In the case, one of plaintiff’s employees was relocating and defendant wanted to purchase the employee’s home.
The District Court of Appeal for the Second District of Florida recently affirmed an order involuntarily dismissing an action to foreclose a second mortgage which secured a home equity line of credit.
In so ruling, the Appellate Court upheld the trial court’s holding that the promissory note for the relevant home equity line of credit was not admissible into evidence because it was nonnegotiable, and thus, not a self-authenticating instrument.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently held that a condominium association acting on its six-month super-priority lien for unpaid condominium assessments pursuant to § 42-1903.13(a)(2) of the District of Columbia Condominium Act (the “D.C. Condo Act”) may not conduct its foreclosure sale subject to a first deed of trust lien, even if the terms of sale stated that the condo unit would be sold subject to first deed of trust.
On March 1, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that a condominium association acting on its six-month super-priority lien for unpaid condominium fees may not perform its foreclosure sale while leaving the property subject to a first deed of trust lien, even if the terms of the sale stated that the condo unit could be sold subject to the first deed of trust. The D.C.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently reversed a lower court’s decision granting summary judgment to a condominium association and held that the association’s foreclosure of a “super-priority” condominium lien may not have extinguished an otherwise first-priority mortgage on the property. SeeU.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Green Parks, LLC, No. 16-cv-842 (D.C. Mar. 13, 2018). In the case, the borrower obtained a loan to purchase a condominium.
The California Court of Appeals recently held that a mortgage (the “Mortgage”) recorded simultaneously with a home equity line of credit (the “HELOC”) had priority and was not entitled to any surplus proceedings from the foreclosure of the HELOC, despite the fact that the HELOC’s instrument number was prior to that of the Mortgage. SeeMTC Fin., Inc. v. Nationstar Mortg., 19 Cal. App. 5th 811 (Ct. App. 2018).