On August 2, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a requirements contract for the supply of electricity constituted a “forward contract” under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, was exempt from preference avoidance actions. The Fifth Circuit held that the contract in this case met the plain language definition of a “forward contract,” notwithstanding the fact that it lacked fixed quantity and delivery date terms. Lightfoot v. MXEnergy Elec., Inc. (In re MBS Mgmt. Servs., Inc.), 2012 WL 3125167 (5th Cir. Aug. 2, 2012).
On July 22, 2011, Bankruptcy Judge Craig A.
In In re Entringer Bakeries, Inc.,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the viability of the “earmarking doctrine” as a judicially-created defense to a preference action under section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.
In recent opinions, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have revisited the doctrine of equitable subordination and have underscored the requirement that, before a court can equitably subordinate a creditor’s claim, the court must find that other creditors have been harmed by the actions of the creditor. Importantly, both decisions stress that equitable subordination is meant to be remedial and not punitive, and may not be imposed merely because a creditor has engaged in misconduct.
Introduction
The bankruptcy trustee of a property management company sought to recover money paid to a power company prior to bankruptcy as an avoidable preference. The Fifth Circuit agreed with both the bankruptcy court and the district court that the payments were settlement payments under a forward contract exempt from avoidance.
In the well-publicized opinion of In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC et al., 599 F. 3d 298 (3rd Cir. 2010), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, agreeing with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,1 held that Section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code)2 is unambiguous and is to be read in the disjunctive, thus allowing a proponent of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization to use the "cram down" power under subsection (iii) of that Section without allowing a secured creditor to credit bid on a sale proposed as part of the plan.
Undersecured creditors face unique challenges because they are neither fully secured nor fully unsecured. Beyond the obviously undesirable issue of being upside-down on their deal, undersecured creditors often are exposed to preference liability for those payments they received in the 90 days prior to the debtor filing bankruptcy. This is especially true where an aggressive trustee is looking to create value or where an opportunistic trustee sees a chance to make a quick buck.
Bankruptcy remote structures have become common in recent years to attempt to prevent a borrower from filing for Chapter 11. One such structure is commonly referred to as a “golden share.” The “golden share” typically refers to a noneconomic membership interest provided to a lender whose vote would be necessary for the borrower to file Chapter 11.
The Fifth Circuit in InreFranchiseServs.ofN.Am.,Inc., 891 F.3d 198, 209
The reality of a bankruptcy proceeding is that creditors often receive less than a full distribution on their claims, forcing them to absorb such losses or look for new avenues to make themselves whole. The “bankruptcy haircut” is more often the case for general unsecured creditors and occurs less often for secured creditors (when they are not undersecured) and lessors (when they are not underwater on their lease). Sometimes creditors have the luxury of looking to guarantors to mitigate their losses when the guarantors are not insolvent or otherwise judgment proof.