In North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, the Delaware Supreme Court, in a case of first impression, addressed the ability of creditors to assert claims for breach of fiduciary duty against directors of a Delaware corporation that is insolvent or operating within the zone of insolvency.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado, applying Colorado law, has denied an insurer's motion for summary judgment and granted in part motions for partial summary judgment by the policyholder's former CEO and a bankruptcy trustee as assignee of the policyholder's former directors. Genesis Ins. Co. v. Crowley, 2007 WL 1832039 (D. Colo. June 25, 2007).

In a significant Delaware law decision regarding creditors’ ability to sue corporate fiduciaries, the Delaware Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of whether a corporate director owes fiduciary duties to the creditors of a company that is insolvent or in the “zone of insolvency.” In North American Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, the court concluded that directors of a solvent Delaware corporation that is operating in the zone of insolvency owe their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders, and not creditors.

While the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provision in section 546(e) previously provided comfort for brokerdealers, the Bankruptcy Court’s decision in Gredd v. Bear, Stearns Securities Corp. (In re Manhattan Investment Fund, Ltd.), 359 B.R. 510 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), chips away at this provision and creates new risks for those providing brokerage account services. Always at risk as a deep pocket, new duties have been thrust upon brokerdealers that go far beyond the terms of the account agreement.

Factual Background

In Motorola, Inc. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007), the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”) and the debtors’ lenders sought approval of a settlement prior to confirmation of a plan of reorganization. While the Court concluded that many aspects of the settlement might otherwise be approved, it found that a provision that distributed funds in violation of the absolute priority rule lacked sufficient justification.

On the Friday before Labor Day, Judge James Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York shocked the distressed bond market by dismissing the preference and fraudulent transfer counts of Iridium LLC Creditors Committee’s $3.7 billion adversary proceeding against Motorola, Inc. Judge Peck found that the Committee had failed to prove that Iridium was insolvent at any time—even the day before bankruptcy. Iridium’s $1.6 billion in bonds dropped from the mid-20s to low single digits in days.

In previous editions of the Business Restructuring Review, we reported on a pair of highly controversial rulings handed down in late 2005 and early 2006 by the New York bankruptcy court overseeing the chapter 11 cases of embattled energy broker Enron Corporation and its affiliates. In the first, Bankruptcy Judge Arthur J. Gonzalez held that a claim is subject to equitable subordination under section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code even if it is assigned to a third-party transferee who was not involved in any misconduct committed by the original holder of the debt.

In 1991, a decision of the Delaware Chancery Court helped popularize the term "zone of insolvency.”[1] In the intervening 16 years, numerous courts and commentators have cited this decision as standing for the proposition that the directors of a Delaware corporation that is either insolvent or in the zone of insolvency owe fiduciary duties to the creditors, as well as to the shareholders, of the corporation.

Thinking about investing in a distressed company? If the company declares bankruptcy, your investment may be subject to equitable subordination, whereby your claim is subordinated to the claims of other creditors. One of the most crucial factors in determining whether your claim is equitably subordinated is whether you are deemed an insider as an insider’s actions undergo significantly more scrutiny than those of non-insiders. Of course, when investing in a distressed company, the more control over the entity’s, the better, right?

The Delaware Supreme Court’s recent decision in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla1 addresses the fiduciary duties of corporate directors in Delaware. In affirming a lower court decision by the Delaware Court of Chancery,2 the Delaware Supreme Court held that creditors of a Delaware corporation that is insolvent or in the “zone of insolvency” have no right to bring direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty against directors.