In In re Interstate Bakeries Corporation, ___ F.3d ___ (8th Cir. 2012) (IBC), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a perpetual, royalty-free trademark license was an executory contract and therefore subject to assumption or rejection by a bankruptcy debtor. This decision is at odds with a recent decision from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, In re Exide Technologies, 607 F.3d 957 (3d Cir. 2010), which found that such a license under similar circumstances was not an executory contract and could thus not be assumed or rejected by the bankruptcy debtor.

Affirming the bankruptcy and district courts below, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in In re Federal-Mogul Global Inc., 684 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2012), held that a debtor could assign insurance policies to an asbestos trust established under section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, notwithstanding anti-assignment provisions in the policies and applicable state law.

Asbestos Trusts in Bankruptcy

On July 25, 2012, the Third Circuit issued its decision in In re American Capital Equipment LLC and Skinner Engine Co., 688 F.3d 145 (3rd Cir. 2012), becoming the first circuit court to align itself with numerous district courts that have allowed bankruptcy courts to reject a Chapter 11 plan prior to a confirmation hearing.

Perfection of security interests in intellectual property can be a trap for the unwary.  In general, secured parties are often confused about where to file in order to perfect a security interest.  This is not surprising as the perfection regime differs depending on the type of intellectual property.  As a starting point, one should determine the general rule for the main classes of intellectual property:  trademarks, patents and copyrights.

It is not uncommon for a supplier of goods or services to receive a demand letter or adversary complaint alleging that it received avoidable transfers—commonly known as "preferential payments" or "preferences"—during the 90 days preceding a customer's bankruptcy filing. Such claims arise under section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code, and can result in a supplier having to return certain payments made during the 90-day preference period.

In the 2010 decision of In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d. Cir. 2010), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a plan proponent could deny a secured creditor the right to credit bid on its collateral when the sale was made pursuant to a plan of reorganization. That holding was a surprise to many given that secured creditors were specifically authorized to credit bid in stand-alone sales under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. A year or so later, another circuit court, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, came to the opposite conclusion.

In In re River East Plaza, LLC, 669 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2012), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a bankruptcy court's ruling that a debtor could not "cram down" a chapter 11 plan over the objection of an undersecured creditor which had made a section 1111(b) election by substituting a lien on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds as the "indubitable equivalent" of the creditor's mortgage lien on the property.

In a much anticipated opinion,In re TOUSA, Inc., --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL 1673910 (11th Cir. May 15, 2012), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has resolved a disagreement between the Bankruptcy Court and District Court for the Southern District of Florida by upholding the Bankruptcy Court’s findings—to the chagrin of lenders, who are now arguably exposed to new liabilities and higher standards of due diligence.

The United States Supreme Court unanimously[1] held that secured creditors have a statutory right to credit bid their debt at an asset sale conducted under a so-called "cramdown" plan. RadLAX Gateway Hotels, LLC et al., v. Amalgamated Bank (In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC),__S.Ct.__ No. 11-166, 2012 WL 1912197 (U.S. May 29, 2012).

How Does RadLAX Impact Conventional Chapter 11 Plan Structures?