On June 9, 2014, the United States Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion in Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 573 U.S. ___ (2014), affirming the Ninth Circuit and holding that, while the Constitution does not permit a bankruptcy court to issue a final ruling in certain circumstances, it is permitted to issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to be reviewed de novo by the district court.
Bankruptcy practitioners are anxiously awaiting a U.S. Supreme Court ruling that will determine whether a party can waive its right to trial before an Article III tribunal.
The power of an appellate court in the federal system to stay the orders of lower courts or to enjoin conduct that lower courts have refused to enjoin, so as to preserve the appellate court’s jurisdiction to review those orders on ultimate appeal, is clearly established yet infrequently invoked. In addition to other potential sources, the power derives from the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.
In December, the Sixth Circuit, in Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, P.C. v. Still (In re McKenzie), 737 F.3d 1034 (6th Cir. 2013), addressed two matters of first impression when it adopted the majority rules that (i) a creditor who seeks relief from the bankruptcy automatic stay has the burden to prove the validity of its perfected security interest in collateral; and (ii) the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations on bankruptcy avoidance actions does not prevent the trustee from asserting them defensively under section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.
In recent years, bankruptcy courts have come closer to reaching a consensus regarding their ability to recharacterize debt into equity. Yet, beneath this consensus lies a deepening divide that lenders should be aware of. Recharacterization challenges “the assertion of a debt against the bankruptcy estate on the ground that the ‘loaned’ capital was actually an equity investment.” In re Insilco Techs., Inc., 480 F.3d 212, 217 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted).
The Tenth Circuit recently analyzed the interplay between sections 523(a)(5) and 523(a)(15) of the Bankruptcy Code in connection with a judgment obtained by a former husband for overpayment of his spousal support obligations. Eloisa Taylor, the debtor in In re Taylor, 2013 WL 6404952 (10th Cir.
The Seventh Circuit has explicitly adopted the Second Circuit’s broad interpretation of the terms “transfer” and “settlement payment” in the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions. See Peterson v. Somers Dublin Ltd., No. 12-2463, --- F.3d ----, 2013 WL 4767495 (7th Cir. Sept.
In the last edition of the CRABS E-Newsletter we discussed the steps that were taken by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. to protect records in its possession during the course of bankruptcy litigation with a Chapter 7 Trustee by using the attorney client privilege in McCarthy v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re El-Atari), 2013 WL 593705 (Bankr. Va. 2013).
Appellate courts continue to agree on the vitality and breadth of the safe harbor defense contained in Bankruptcy Code ("Code") § 546(e) (insulating from the trustee's fraudulent transfer or preference attack "settlement payment" or "margin payment" on a "securities contract," "commodity contract" or "forward contract" except when the debtor's payment is made with "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" creditors). In re Quebecor World (USA) Inc., 2013 WL2460726, *1 (2d Cir.
On April 29, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States declined to hear an appeal of the Second Circuit's decision dismissing, as equitably moot, appeals arising out of the bankruptcy of Charter Communications and let stand the opinion in In re Charter Communications, Inc., 691 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 2012). As a result, the application of the equitable mootness doctrine, as it applies to bankruptcy appeals, will continue to vary among jurisdictions.