The director at the heart of the Carrington Wire pension fund deficit saga has been disqualified for a period of 12 years.

Background

During the bankruptcy cycle following the recession of 2001, numerous debtors – notably airlines such as US Airways and United Air Lines, Inc. – undertook “distress terminations” of their ERISA-qualified defined benefit pension plans, which are insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). The PBGC found itself holding large general unsecured claims arising from significant underfunding of pension plans insured by the PBGC as a result of these terminations. Efforts by the PBGC to obtain either administrative priority or secured status for these claims invariably failed.1

New guidance from the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) regarding pre-packaged administrations (pre-packs) outlines their approach to pre-packs when the same insolvency practitioner (IP) proposes to continue as office holder in any subsequent liquidation or company voluntary arrangement (CVA).

In the current market turmoil, several banking and insurance names have already had to be rescued by government-brokered packages. It is therefore timely to review what rights institutional investors have in the event of counterparty insolvency. Unfortunately, the picture is complicated, not just because the question of how pension fund investors can get their money back may have an international dimension, but also because governments keep moving the goalposts on the availability and adequacy of compensation schemes.

Where does the claim arise?

In February this year, Squire colleagues Paul Muscutt and Helen Kavanagh wrote about the Carrington Wire Defined Benefit Pension Scheme, where  the UK Pensions Regulator accepted a payment of £8.5m to settle warning notices of £17.7m issued to Russian companies that had guaranteed sums due from Carrington Wire to the Scheme (“the Guarantee”).

Two documents on winding up procedures have recently been released for consultation. The first is a joint statement by the Pensions Regulator, the Pension Protection Fund and the DWP in respect of the Financial Assistance Scheme on the regulation of schemes in wind up and in a PPF assessment period. The second is a set of good practice guidelines from the Pensions Regulator on avoiding delays in the winding up of schemes.

The UK’s Pension Protection Fund (PPF) is about to publish new guidelines to reflect their increased focus on the approval of Insolvency Practitioner’s (IPs) fees. The guidelines require IPs to provide more regular detail of accruing and anticipated costs to the PPF when they are appointed over employers where Defined Benefit (Final Salary) pension schemes are significant creditors. More specifically IPs will now be required to provide a more detailed explanation of how their proposed remuneration reflects the value provided to creditors.

In the United Kingdom, the Pension Protection Fund (“PPF”) is the safety net for the employee members of a defined benefit pension plan or scheme.  The PPF compensates members when an employer has not and cannot put sufficient assets in the pension scheme to meet its obligations to member employees and the employer has suffered a “qualifying insolvency event”.

Bankruptcy Judge Chris Klein recently issued his formal confirmation opinion in Stockton’s Chapter 9 bankruptcy case. While there were no real surprises, the opinion makes for entertaining reading given the Court’s more than serious conclusion that:

Carrington Wire Defined Benefit Pension Scheme was set up for the benefit of the employees of Carrington Wire Limited; a Yorkshire based company engaged in the sale and supply of steel and wire products. Carrington, which started to wind down its business at the end of 2009, was at that time owned by Severstal, a Russian based international steel company. The scheme’s liabilities were guaranteed by Severstal’s parent company.