This article was originally published in Law360. Any opinions in this article are not those of Winston & Strawn or its clients. The opinions in this article are the authors' opinions only.
In Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. 50509 Marine LLC et al.[1] the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. can recover an employer's defined benefit pension plan termination liability--often millions of dollars--from controlled group members that did not even exist when the contributing employer liquidated years earlier.[2]
On June 7th, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the entry of summary judgment dismissing Chapter 13 debtors' claims against Wells Fargo, which holds debtors' mortgages. Debtors alleged that Wells Fargo violated the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provisions by recording in its internal records the fees it incurred to file its proof of claim. The Eleventh Circuit held that Wells Fargo did not violate the automatic stay because it had not collected or attempt to collect those fees. Similarly, a claim based on Wells Fargo's failure to disclose the fees was not yet ripe for action.
On April 26th, the Eleventh Circuit held that the anti-injunction provision of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act prohibits a federal district court from enjoining the FDIC. A trial court had initially imposed a TRO against a failing bank prohibiting it from taking any action with respect to $1 billion worth of mortgage proceeds it held in trust for petitioner, Bank of America, who held legal title. When the FDIC was appointed receiver, the FDIC moved to dissolve the TRO. The trial court refused converting the TRO into a preliminary injunction.
The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently issued the first appellate decision holding that, in actions brought by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the officers and directors of failed banking institutions can assert affirmative defenses relating to the FDIC’s post-receivership conduct.
In a corporate system based in part on the separation of ownership and control, the relationship between principals and agents is riddled with agency problems: Among them are potential conflicts of interest where agents may abuse their fiduciary position for their own benefit as opposed to the benefit of the principals to whom they are obligated. Delineating the agents' fiduciary duties is thus a central focus of corporate law, and the dereliction of those duties often comes under scrutiny in the bankruptcy context.
Overview
The Bankruptcy Protector
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently issued an opinion that calls into question the long-held Barton doctrine following the dismissal of a bankruptcy case and thus the jurisdiction of that court. In Tufts v. Hay, No. 19-11496 --- F.3d ----, 2020 WL 6144563 (11th Cir. Oct. 20, 2020), the court considered where a litigant may bring suit against counsel appointed by a bankruptcy court after the bankruptcy case was dismissed.
In 1994, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to, among other things, add section 1123(d), which provides that, if a chapter 11 plan proposes to “cure” a default under a contract, the cure amount must be determined in accordance with the underlying agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy law. Since then, a majority of courts have held that such a cure amount must include any default-rate interest required under either the contract or applicable nonbankruptcy law. A ruling recently handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit endorses this view.
In a recent decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed its position sanctioning, under appropriate circumstances, nonconsensual third party release provisions in chapter 11 plans. In SE Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc.(In re Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc.), 780 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2015), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed bankruptcy and district court decisions approving a debtor’s chapter 11 plan that released the debtor’s former principals over the objection of a noninsider equity holder.