The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently held that the word “surrender” in the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2), requires that debtors relinquish all of their rights to the collateral.

In so ruling, the Court ordered the borrowers to “surrender” their house to the mortgagee in a foreclosure action, and held that the bankruptcy court had the authority to compel the borrowers to fulfill their mandatory duty under 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) not to oppose a foreclosure action in state court.

On July 10, 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC. That opinion began by decrying the “deluge” of proofs of claim filed by debt buyers on debts that are unenforceable under state statutes of limitations.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently held that “[a]n accurate and complete proof of claim on a time-barred debt is not false, deceptive, misleading, unfair, or unconscionable under the FDCPA.”

In arriving at this holding, the Court declined to follow the Eleventh Circuit’s rulings in Crawford and Johnson.

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion.

In a much-anticipated follow-up to its 2014 decision in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 738 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently held that there is no irreconcilable conflict between the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Bankruptcy Code.

The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida recently dismissed allegations that a debt buyer violated the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by filing a proof of claim on time-barred debt, holding that such claims are precluded by the Bankruptcy Code, and that the FDCPA does not provide a private right of action against debt collectors who file time-barred proofs of claim in bankruptcy court.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently held, in a case of first impression, that a creditor violates the bankruptcy discharge injunction by filing a proof of claim on a debt that was previously discharged in another bankruptcy proceeding.

A copy of the opinion is available at: Link to Opinion.

Companies that plan to sell goods or services to a debtor in bankruptcy should be aware of a recent case decided by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, holding that a trustee may avoid a debtor’s post-petition transfers of cash collateral if such transfers were made without the consent of the secured party or court order.1

On April 18, 2007, in Fla. Dep’t. of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (In re Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.),1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the stamp tax exemption of 11 USC § 1146(c)2 may apply to transfers of assets that were necessary to the consummation of a bankruptcy plan of reorganization and were made prior to confirmation of the plan. In reaching this decision, the Eleventh Circuit declined to follow decisions of the Third and Fourth Circuits to the contrary and thus created a split among the circuits on this issue.

A discharge of debt in bankruptcy “operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor. . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2). Certain debts, however, including debts “for violation of . . . any of the State securities laws,” are not subject to discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19). A discharge injunction does not bar the collection of such debts.

The subject matter jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts causes confusion and can be hard to understand. In a recent decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit clarified the meaning of the phrase “related to” in 28 U.S.C. §1334(b), the federal statute that governs the subject matter jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts.[1]