The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (the “Eleventh Circuit”) has become the first circuit court to extend sections 1692e and 1692f of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) to proofs of claim filed in a bankruptcy case, ruling that a debt collector is prohibited from filing a proof of claim on debt that is barred by the applicable state statute of limitation. In Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, et al.
In the world of bank holding company bankruptcies, often a dispute arises between the parent company and the FDIC (as receiver for parent’s failed bank subsidiary) over the ownership of the tax refunds issued to the bank’s consolidated group pursuant to a consolidated tax return.
The Eleventh Circuit’s recent opinion in Wiand v. Lee clarifies longstanding issues relating to an equity receiver’s standing to pursue clawback claims for the benefit of the receivership estate under the Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“FUFTA”). See Wiand v. Lee, 2014 WL 2446084 (11th Cir. Jun.
Creditors in bankruptcy cases may be interested in the July 10, 2014 Opinion issued by the Eleventh Circuit in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC.
In Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, the Eleventh Circuit became the first federal circuit court of appeals to hold that filing a proof of claim on a time-barred debt in a bankruptcy case violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”).[1] See No. 13-12389,__ F.3d __, 2014 WL 3361226 (11th Cir.
In this week’s Alabama Law Weekly Update, we share with you two decisions from the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. The first concerns non-competition agreements and the second deals with FDCPA violations in bankruptcy cases.
Dawson v. Ameritox, LTD, No. 14-10084 (11th Cir. July 10, 2014) (holding that non-compete agreement was void under Ala. Code § 8-1-1, where employee signed the agreement four days before his employment officially began).
What do you get when you combine a 20+ year old bankruptcy, a contaminated landfill, and a state regulatory agency that moves at a glacial pace? The answer: In re Solitron Devices, Inc., a recent decision from the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida.
Bankruptcy Court holds that Section 521(a)(2) is more than a mere notice statute and that a chapter 7 debtor’s stated intent to surrender real property under that provision means that a debtor must allow the mortgagee to take possession through foreclosurewWithout interference or impediment
In Lodge v. Kondaur Capital Corp., Case No. 13-10919 (decided May 8, 2014), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided an issue that it never previously addressed: whether a party could recover damages under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) for emotional distress resulting from another party’s violation of the automatic stay in bankruptcy. In Lodge, the Court held that such damages were recoverable but could not be recovered in the particular circumstances of that case.
The United States Supreme Court recently denied certiorari to an Eleventh Circuit appeal which would have addressed the issue of whether section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code permits a chapter 7 debt to “strip off”1 a wholly unsecured junior lien in Bank of America, N.A. v. Sinkfield.2 As a result, wholly unsecured junior creditors will continue to suffer the harsh consequence of having its junior lien completely “stripped off” in Eleventh Circuit bankruptcy cases, despite other Circuits around the country holding to the contrary.