In a bankruptcy preferential transfer dispute, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently held that the bankruptcy trustee could recover true overdraft covering deposits, while deposits covering intra-day overdrafts were not recoverable.
A copy of the opinion is available at: Link to Opinion.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Merit Management Group L.P. v. FTI Consulting Inc. to resolve a circuit split over the interpretation of Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the “safe harbor” provision that shields specified types of payments “made by or to (or for the benefit of)” a financial institution from avoidance on fraudulent transfer grounds.
In our previous two news alerts,1 we examined decisions that potentially undermine key elements of the legal structures that lenders created in response to their experiences in the United States Bankruptcy Courts during the real estate downturn of 1988 through 1992, including the involuntary restructure of their indebtedness and liens under the cram-down provisions of title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Codeâ€).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently held that a secured party’s foreclosure did not discharge an otherwise valid security interest in the proceeds of the collateral, nor did it preclude the creditor from pursuing its rights to such proceeds.
A substantive non-consolidation opinion is a common feature of structured finance transactions in the U.S. Most, if not all, opine as to what a bankruptcy court would do, but express no opinion on the appellate process. We would venture a guess that most opinion recipients assume that if the bankruptcy court gets it wrong, their rights will be vindicated on appeal. The Eighth Circuit opinion in Opportunity Finance1 casts a troubling shadow over that assumption.
Background
On July 10, 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC. That opinion began by decrying the “deluge” of proofs of claim filed by debt buyers on debts that are unenforceable under state statutes of limitations.
The Second Circuit’s recent opinion in The Matter of: Motors Liquidation Company, 2016 WL 3766237 (2nd Cir. 2016) should give pause to all buyers of assets from bankruptcy estates.
Last week, the Seventh Circuit chimed in on whether time barred proofs of claim violate the FDCPA.In Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, the Seventh Circuit affirmed three district court decisions which dismissed consumer’s FDCPA claims against debt buyers who filed time barred proofs of claim.Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, Nos. 15-2044, 15-2082, 15-2109 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2016).In doing so, the Seventh Circuit joins the Second and Eighth Circuits in siding against the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014).
Upon receiving notice of a debtor’s bankruptcy case, the prudent debt collector typically files a proof of claim, in the hope of receiving some distribution from the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. Absent a fraudulent claim by the debt collector, the Bankruptcy Code specifically provides for the filing of claims against the debtor’s estate. So how could a debt collector be sued for doing what the Code allows? It could happen if debts a collector actually holds are barred from enforcement under a state statute of limitations.
In order to confirm a chapter 11 plan, at least one class of creditors whose claims are “impaired” must accept the plan. The concept of “impairment” is very broad. Under the Bankruptcy Code, a class of claims is impaired unless the plan “leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual rights” to which the holder of the claim is entitled. That alteration can be very modest: payment in full but paid half at confirmation and the other half in 30 days, reduction of the applicable interest rate by one basis point, etc.