For more than 10 years, the courts in New Jersey were split as to whether, under the Bankruptcy Code, a chapter 13 debtor’s right to cure a default on a mortgage loan secured by the debtor’s primary residence expired at the foreclosure sale, or at the time the deed to the foreclosed property was delivered to the purchaser. That split now has been resolved by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in favor of the line of cases cutting off the right to cure at the time of the foreclosure sale. In re Connors, No. 06-3321 (3d Cir., Aug. 3, 2007).
In Kendrick v. Deutsche National Trust Company (In re Saint Clair), 380 B.R. 478 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. Jan. 16, 2008), the Chapter 7 Trustee appealed the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky to the Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”). The issue on appeal was whether summary judgment was warranted against the Appellee-Mortgagor (“Mortgagor”) on the Appellant- Trustee’s (“Trustee”) complaint seeking to avoid a mortgage on the Debtors’ real property.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts recently denied a mortgage purchaser’s Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay of Chapter 13 proceedings on the ground that the purchaser lacked standing where it could not provide documentary evidence showing each transfer of the mortgage. In re Robin Hayes, Case No. 07-13967-JNF (August 19, 2008).
In November 2004, the Debtor, Robin Hayes, obtained a $324,000 mortgage from Argent Mortgage Company LLC (“Argent Mortgage”). The mortgage subsequently was sold and ultimately ended up with Deutsche Bank.
Beginning on September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI”) and 16 of its affiliates (the “Debtors”) filed voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. The resulting bankruptcy cases are jointly administered by the bankruptcy court for procedural purposes (collectively, the “Chapter 11 Proceeding”), but to date, the Debtors remain separate legal entities.
Last week, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Bailey,2 establishing an important precedent concerning the ability of bankruptcy courts to release claims against third party non-debtors in chapter 11 plans of reorganization. In the June 2009 issue of Cadwalader’s Restructuring Review newsletter, we introduced this case and considered the potential implications of a ruling on this important but unsettled topic.
Remember Sabena, the ill-fated Belgian airline that declared bankruptcy in 2001? Well, to quote Ford Madox Ford, this is the saddest story I have ever heard.
Last week, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Bailey,2 establishing an important precedent concerning the ability of bankruptcy courts to release claims against third party non-debtors in chapter 11 plans of reorganization. In the June 2009 issue of Cadwalader’s Restructuring Review newsletter, we introduced this case and considered the potential implications of a ruling on this important but unsettled topic.
In a recent decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “U.S. Court”) exercised its abstention powers and dismissed an involuntary chapter 11 petition filed against an Argentine company, Compania de Alimentos Fargo, SA (“Fargo”).1 Fargo, a debtor in an insolvency proceeding in Argentina, had moved to dismiss the involuntary petition principally because its Argentine bankruptcy case was still pending.
A recent federal district court appellate decision issued in the Enron chapter 11 case1 has ruled that the postpetition transfer of a prepetition bankruptcy claim from one party to another may insulate the transferred claim against certain types of attack based solely on conduct by a prior holder of the same claim. Whether a particular claim is protected depends upon how the claim was transferred.