FSA has published a guidance consultation on the prudential treatment of liquidity swaps. According to the FSA, a liquidity swap involves a liquidity transformation. Typically they involve transactions between an insurer and a bank whereby high-credit quality, liquid assets (such as gilts) held by an insurer is exchanged with illiquid or less liquid assets (such as asset-backed securities (ABS)) held by a bank. The proposed guidance will apply to all regulated firms transacting liquidity swaps (not just banks and insurers) and the deadline for responses is 21 September 2011.
Structured finance transaction documents have typically included subordination provisions in their post-default waterfalls, effectively changing a swap counterparty’s right to get paid from above that of the noteholders to below that of the noteholders.
The case concerned credit default swaps entered into between Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc., and various parties, and the rights of the parties in respect of collateral held by a trustee.
Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.’s pending appeal against the judgments of the UK High Court and the Court of Appeal in the so called “flip clause cases”, concerning the enforceability of flip clauses, is scheduled to be begin with Belmont Park Investments Pty Limited (Belmont Park Investments Pty Limited v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc (UKSC 2009/0222)) on March 1, 2011.
Introduction
For all of the legal difficulties which market participants are facing in light of the insolvency of Lehman Brothers, the insolvency is providing the Courts with the opportunity to pass judgment on many of the tricky provisions of the 1992 and 2002 versions of the ISDA Master Agreement (together the "Agreements").
There have been so many articles written and opinions expressed on the spate of cases on the effect of how netting provisions in over-the-counter ("OTC") derivative contracts work when a counterparty becomes in default, that you would be forgiven for being confused about the current position. Now that the dust has settled (for the time being at least), this article takes stock and seeks to make matters as straightforward as possible.
Background
On January 25, 2010, the U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Peck struck down a provision that used the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (“LBHI”) to trigger subordination of a Lehman subsidiary’s swap claim against a securitization vehicle in the United Kingdom.1
Structured finance transactions frequently subordinate a swap counterparty’s rights to termination payments upon termination of a swap by reason of counterparty default. Such a provision has recently been upheld by an English court. As the case concerns the insolvency of Lehman Brothers however, the US courts must also make a decision on the same provision.
ISDA has written to Treasury on its plans to make insolvency regulations in relation to investment banks. It supports Treasury's plan to take legislative steps only if market practice and regulatory approaches do not work. It endorses the view that sophisticated counterparties should have as much flexibility as possible. It notes the interaction of any regime for investment banks with existing regimes must be clear but does not currently see a compelling case for changes to the current regime.