The case concerning the Game group of companies' administration has now been played out in the Court of Appeal and the eagerly anticipated judgment has been handed down.
The issue at stake concerned a landlord's ability to recover rent as an expense of administration (and therefore payable before other creditors) where such rent is payable in advance but where the tenant's administration occurs immediately before a quarter day's rent falling due.
FRC has issued guidance to banks' directors on financial reporting of solvency and liquidity risks, and the definition of going concern, in the context of post-crisis reforms and central bank and government support. (Source: Guidance for Directors of Banks)
English schemes of arrangement (Schemes) have become a useful and established procedure for restructuring the debts of foreign companies incurred under English law finance documents. For an overview of why they are useful and how they work, see our July 2011 article "Financial restructurings of foreign companies through English schemes of arrangement".
Lending to a foreign company? If you choose English law to govern your facility documents and provide for the English court to have exclusive jurisdiction, an English scheme may be a viable means of restructuring the debt later, if the need arises.
Background
Under the Pensions Act 2004 the Pensions Regulator (tPR) has the power to impose a financial support direction (FSD) requiring a company “connected or associated” with the sponsoring employer of a UK pension fund to provide financial support to the pension fund. To date tPR has used the power in insolvencies.
The insolvency of the borrower is a standard event of default in facility agreements. As well as covering the borrower's cash flow insolvency, these clauses also often cover other, earlier signs of distress. Two recent cases have seen lenders try to exploit these outer reaches of their insolvency event of default clauses. Hayley Çapani and Adam Pierce explain why these cases are significant for parties negotiating new deals, and for lenders considering their enforcement options on existing deals.
Negotiations with creditors for rescheduling
The Government has decided to create a Special Administration Regime (SAR) for systemically important payment and securities settlement systems. It is concerned that, were one of these market infrastructures to become insolvent, the administrator or liquidator would have to work towards maximising value for creditors, rather than keeping critical payment and settlement services running. The Bank of England would have the power to apply to court for an order declaring the start of SAR proceedings. Ensuring continuity of service would be among the special administrator’s objectives.
BoE has published a paper on central counterparty (CCP) loss-allocation rules. To avoid a CCP’s insolvency, these rules allocate among the CCP’s participants any losses exceeding the CCP’s pre-funded default resources, such as the margin posted by clearing members (CMs), the mutualised default fund and the CCP’s own equity. The options the paper suggests include calling additional resources from CMs, applying haircuts to margin owed to any CM or terminating unmatched open contracts.
The Court of Appeal has given guidance on when the duty of directors to have regard to the interest of creditors arises. This is an important point, as the general statutory duty of a director to promote the success of the company for the benefit of the company's members is expressly subject to the rules on creditors' interests. The court's decision also considers whether a dividend payment can be challenged as a transaction at an undervalue under section 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986.
Facts
The Government has fed back on the responses to DBIS’s consultation on the effect of bankruptcy on the ability to access a basic bank account. Responses to the consultation have shown that only 27% of people subject to a bankruptcy order are able to retain their bank account. A bank's decision not to offer a bank account to a bankrupt is mainly based on the bankrupt's credit record, rather than on the risk of the trustee making a claim against the bank, a risk that the consultation process has shown is more perceived than real.