In a matter of first impression, the Delaware Court of Chancery held inQuadrant Structured Products Co. Ltd. v. Vertin, No. 6990-VCL, 2015 BL 128889 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2015), that a creditor suing derivatively on behalf of an insolvent corporation does not lose standing to prosecute the derivative claims if the corporation becomes solvent while the lawsuit is pending. In so ruling, the court expressly rejected a “continuous insolvency” or an “irretrievable insolvency” requirement for standing purposes.
In Quadrant Structured Products Co., Ltd. v. Vertin, C.A. No. 6990-VCL, 2015 WL 2062115 (Del. Ch.
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed on May 18, 2007, the Delaware Chancery Court’s dismissal of a breach of fiduciary duty suit brought by a creditor against certain directors of Clearwire Holdings Inc. North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, C.A. No. 1456-N (May 18, 2007).
Whether a creditor may assert a direct claim against corporate directors for breach of fiduciary duty when the corporation is insolvent or in the so-called “zone of insolvency.”
Answer: No.
On May 18, 2007, in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla (“Gheewalla”),1 the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision2 in which the Court of Chancery precluded creditors from filing direct suits for breach of fiduciary duty against directors of corporations that are either in the zone of insolvency or are actually insolvent. With its decision, the Delaware Supreme Court has limited creditors’ ability to sue directors for breach of fiduciary duty.
In North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, the Delaware Supreme Court, in a case of first impression, addressed the ability of creditors to assert claims for breach of fiduciary duty against directors of a Delaware corporation that is insolvent or operating within the zone of insolvency.
In a significant Delaware law decision regarding creditors’ ability to sue corporate fiduciaries, the Delaware Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of whether a corporate director owes fiduciary duties to the creditors of a company that is insolvent or in the “zone of insolvency.” In North American Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, the court concluded that directors of a solvent Delaware corporation that is operating in the zone of insolvency owe their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders, and not creditors.
In 1991, a decision of the Delaware Chancery Court helped popularize the term "zone of insolvency.”[1] In the intervening 16 years, numerous courts and commentators have cited this decision as standing for the proposition that the directors of a Delaware corporation that is either insolvent or in the zone of insolvency owe fiduciary duties to the creditors, as well as to the shareholders, of the corporation.
The Delaware Supreme Court has affirmed, without opinion, a ruling by a lower court that ‘deepening insolvency’ is not a cause of action under Delaware law. Trenwick America Litig. Trust v. Billett, 931 A.2d 438 (Del. 2007).
The ruling appears to be the strongest nail yet in the coffin of so-called “deepening insolvency” actions.
The Delaware Supreme Court’s recent decision in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla1 addresses the fiduciary duties of corporate directors in Delaware. In affirming a lower court decision by the Delaware Court of Chancery,2 the Delaware Supreme Court held that creditors of a Delaware corporation that is insolvent or in the “zone of insolvency” have no right to bring direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty against directors.
For the third time in as many years, the Delaware Chancery Court has handed down an important ruling interpreting the interaction between federal bankruptcy law and Delaware corporate law. The thorny question this time was whether a bankruptcy court’s determination that the directors of a corporation acted in good faith when they authorized a chapter 11 filing precluded a subsequent claim that the directors breached their fiduciary duties by doing so. The Delaware Chancery Court concluded that it did, ruling in Nelson v.