First and foremost here at the Drug and Device Law Blog, we like good, strong defense decisions. If those decisions contain lessons (or reminders) for our everyday practice – so much the better. That’s why we’ve blogged about cases that let us remind you to check publicly available information about plaintiffs, make sure the plaintiff was alive when she filed suit, and search bankruptcy filings to see if plaintiff disclosed her lawsuit. We
There are essentially three types of insolvency proceeding: liquidation, receivership and administration. Liquidators realise and distribute a company’s assets before dissolving the company. Receivers usually realise certain secured assets to repay certain debts, before appointing a liquidator. However, an administrator’s first objective is to rescue the company as a going concern. It is only if this is not practicable that the administrator can realise and distribute a company’s assets.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas recently clarified the administrative expense standard applicable to indenture trustees by holding that they can recover fees and expenses as administrative expenses only when they make a “substantial contribution.” This standard requires a greater showing than “benefit to the estate,” which is the general administrative expense standard. In re Sanchez Energy Corp., No. 19-34508 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 3, 2021).
Background
Analyzing the inner workings of the elements required for the securities contract “safe harbor” protection under Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Court for the SDNY dismissed a complaint seeking to recover approximately US$1 billion in allegedly fraudulent transfers brought against various transferees as part of the Boston Generating Chapter 11 case.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently held in In re Tribune Company Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation, No. 13-3992-cv (L) (2d Cir., Dec. 19, 2019) that Bankruptcy Code Section 546(e) barred claims seeking to avoid payments made by Tribune to its shareholders as part of a leveraged buyout (LBO).
After Energy Future Holdings (EFH), maybe not so much. The size of the break-up fee approved by the bankruptcy court in EFH was undoubtedly large by any account – US$275 million. But it was approved following all necessary filings, notice and hearings. All parties and counsel involved were highly sophisticated and experienced. The court that approved the fee was the Delaware bankruptcy court, by all accounts one of the most experienced and sophisticated bankruptcy courts in the nation. And there wasn’t even a hint of fraud, misrepresentation or failure to disclose material facts.
In trotting a path out of Chapter 11, debtors in most cases will need to engage various key stakeholders, some of whom are not entitled to a distribution in the bankruptcy. As a form of remuneration, non-debtors may insist on receiving a release of liability - not only from claims belonging to the debtor, but also the claims of third-parties - in exchange for their support and contribution to the case.
Companies that the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) believes may be subject to FDIC receivership under the Orderly Liquidation Authority contained in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, and certain of their affiliates, are now subject to recordkeeping requirements related to their “qualified financial contracts”1 (QFCs).
In a 5-2 decision, the Supreme Court of the United States in Commonwealth of Puerto Rico et al. v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust et al., 579 U.S. ___ (2016), rejected the Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act (the “Recovery Act”) as preempted by the Bankruptcy Code on June 13, 2016. The practical implication of the decision is that Puerto Rico is currently without options to restructure its billions of dollars in municipal debt, and the only feasible path forward will most likely have to come from Congress.
In what appears to be a matter of first impression, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently held that payments made to investors in a two tiered securitization structure commonly employed in commercial mortgage-backed securitization (“CMBS”) transactions are largely protected from fraudulent or preferential transfer claims by the securities contract safe harbor set forth in Bankruptcy Code section 546(e). Specifically, in Krol v.