The United States Supreme Court, on July 1, 2014, granted a petition for certiorari in an important Seventh Circuit case limiting the power of bankruptcy courts to decide property disputes. Wellness International Network, Ltd. et al. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2013). The Seventh Circuit had held last year that the bankruptcy court lacked the constitutional authority to determine whether purported trust assets were property of the debtor’s estate.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held on Aug. 3, 2012, that equitable considerations could not prevent a creditor's recouping amounts owed to it by a chapter 7 debtor. Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 2012 WL 3139364, *4 (8th Cir. Aug. 3, 2012). Reversing the bankruptcy court and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ("BAP"), the Eighth Circuit explained that "once a party meets the same-transaction test . . . a court should not impose an additional 'balancing of the equities' requirement" on the doctrine of recoupment. Id.

On Feb. 18, 2011, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (the “Circuit Court”) held that (i) an assignment of unsecured contract claims from AT&T to ReGen Capital I, Inc. (“ReGen”) was broad enough to include right to receive “cure” payments in the event the debtor, UAL Corporation (“United”), assumed the underlying executory contracts, but (ii) ReGen could not successfully assert a “cure” claim because United had not assumed the executory contracts, even though United’s confirmed plan of reorganization included them on a list of assumed contracts. ReGen Capital I, Inc. v. UAL Corp.

On Nov. 10, 2009, a Pennsylvania district court held that secured creditors do not have an absolute right to credit bid1 their debt under the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) in an asset sale conducted pursuant to a “cramdown” plan of reorganization that proposes to provide the secured creditors with the “indubitable equivalent” of their claims. In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, Civil Action 09-00178 at 57 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2009). This decision is on appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

Facts

The Ninth Circuit held on July 3, 2008, that an oversecured creditor’s claim for payment was entitled to a “presumption in favor of the loan agreement’s default rate (an additional 2% interest), subject only to reduction based upon any equities involved.” General Elec. Capt’l Corp. v. Future Media Productions, Inc., 2008 WL2610459, *2 (9th Cir. 7/3/08). Reversing the lower courts, the Court of Appeals held that the bankruptcy court had improperly applied a questionable Ninth Circuit precedent when denying the lender a default rate of interest. Id., at *4.

A court-approved pre-plan settlement that would have resolved a dispute between a Chapter 11 creditors’ committee and the debtor’s secured lenders over the lenders’ liens was vacated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on March 5. Motorola, Inc. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors and J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Iridium Operating LLC). The settlement also would have funded massive litigation against the debtor’s former parent, Motorola Inc.

Motorola’s Successful Argument

A Chapter 11 debtor’s financial advisers were entitled to a “Success Fee” based on a percentage of a $50-million “debt-to-equity conversion,” held a split U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on May 4, 2016. In re Valence Technology, Inc., 2016 WL 2587109, *1 (5th Cir. May 4, 2016) (2-1). Key to the opinion was the parties’ concession that the “debt-to-equity conversion qualified as a Private Placement under [their] engagement agreements.” Id., at n.1.

A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stayed the part of a bankruptcy court’s sale order that would have “stripped” a commercial tenant’s lease from the casino property being sold to a third party. In re Revel AC, Inc., 2015 WL 5711358 (3d Cir. Sept. 30, 2015) (2-1).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, on March 19, 2014, held that a corrupt debtor’s pre-bankruptcy cash transfer to a commodity broker was a “settlement payment” made “in connection with a securities contract,” thus falling “within [Bankruptcy Code] §546(e)’s safe harbor” and insulating the transfer from the trustee’s preference claim. Grede v. FCStone, LLC (In re Sentinel Management Group, Inc.), 2014 WL 1041736, *7 (7th Cir. Mar. 19, 2014).

Chapter 11 creditors’ committees and debtors continue to challenge lenders’ prepayment premiums, commitment fees and post-bankruptcy interest claims in reorganization cases. Nevertheless, courts regularly reject these challenges in well-reasoned decisions.