On Aug. 30, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York approved the disclosure statement with respect to the revised second amended joint Chapter 11 plan of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and its affiliated debtors (the “Debtors”). The order approving the Debtors’ disclosure statement and establishing certain procedures related to the hearing to consider confirmation of the plan (the “order”) can be accessed here.

A New York bankruptcy judge held on October 4, 2010, that second lien lenders could object to a debtor’s bid procedures approved by the first lien lenders despite the terms of an intercreditor agreement inIn re Boston Generating, LLC, No. 10-14419 (SCC) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2010).1 The intercreditor agreement provided the first lien lenders with the “exclusive right to…make determinations regarding the…sale” of the collateral. According to the court, however, the agreement did not expressly preclude the second lien lenders from objecting to bid procedures.

In a recent decision, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware allowed the collateral agent for senior lenders to credit bid for the debtors’ assets even though all of the senior lenders had not authorized the bid. One of the senior lenders had objected to the group’s acquisition of the debtors’ assets by the credit bid. In re GWLS Holdings, Inc., 2009 WL 453110 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 23, 2009) (Walsh, J.).

The buyer of a Chapter 11 debtor's coal supply contract was not liable for the seller's obligations to the sales agent who secured the contract for the debtor-seller, according to a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Al Perry Enterprises, Inc. v. Appalachian Fuels, LLC, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22808 (6th Cir. Sept. 27, 2007). As the court explained, the buyer could not be liable to the sales agent "absent an express assumption of the [debtor's prior] obligations." Id. at *17.

Background

A Chapter 11 debtor’s pre-bankruptcy “surrender of [two] … leases to [its landlord] could be regarded as a preferential transfer,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on March 11, 2016. In re Great Lakes Quick Lube LP, 2016 WL 930298, at *2 (7th Cir. March 11, 2016).

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.

Appellate courts continue to agree on the vitality and breadth of the safe harbor defense contained in Bankruptcy Code ("Code") § 546(e) (insulating from the trustee's fraudulent transfer or preference attack "settlement payment" or "margin payment" on a "securities contract," "commodity contract" or "forward contract" except when the debtor's payment is made with "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" creditors). In re Quebecor World (USA) Inc., 2013 WL2460726, *1 (2d Cir.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, overseeing the bankruptcy cases of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI”) and its affiliated debtors (collectively, the “Debtors”), entered an order on Aug.

On September 22, 2010, Bryan Marsal, co-chief executive officer of the restructuring firm Alvarez & Marsal ("A&M") and chief restructuring officer for Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., presented A&M's State of the Estate report regarding the chapter 11 cases of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and its affiliated debtors (collectively, the "Debtors"). In his overview of the State of the Estate report, Marsal outlined the timeline for plan confirmation, the claims reconciliation process, and recovery analysis:  

Plan Confirmation Timeline  

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on March 25, 2009, that a bankruptcy court had improperly surcharged property in the hands of a credit bidding asset buyer with the expenses of the judicial sale. In re Skuna River Lumber, LLC, __F.3d ___, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 6175 (5th Cir. 3/25/09). Explaining that the “bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to take such action,” the Fifth Circuit also vacated the district court’s improper ruling that the bankruptcy judge could enter a personal judgment against the asset buyer. Id., at *9.  

Facts