The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently held that an oversecured lender holds at least an unsecured claim for contractual prepayment penalties against a solvent debtor. UPS Capital Business Credit v. Gencarelli (In re Gencarelli), 2007 BL 91656 (1st Cir., Aug. 30, 2007). As the court explained, "[t]his is a difficult question that has significant ramifications for the commercial lending industry." Id. at 16.

A Chapter 11 debtor’s pre-bankruptcy “surrender of [two] … leases to [its landlord] could be regarded as a preferential transfer,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on March 11, 2016. In re Great Lakes Quick Lube LP, 2016 WL 930298, at *2 (7th Cir. March 11, 2016).

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.

Appellate courts continue to agree on the vitality and breadth of the safe harbor defense contained in Bankruptcy Code ("Code") § 546(e) (insulating from the trustee's fraudulent transfer or preference attack "settlement payment" or "margin payment" on a "securities contract," "commodity contract" or "forward contract" except when the debtor's payment is made with "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" creditors). In re Quebecor World (USA) Inc., 2013 WL2460726, *1 (2d Cir.

On Aug. 30, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York approved the disclosure statement with respect to the revised second amended joint Chapter 11 plan of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and its affiliated debtors (the “Debtors”). The order approving the Debtors’ disclosure statement and establishing certain procedures related to the hearing to consider confirmation of the plan (the “order”) can be accessed here.

A New York bankruptcy judge held on October 4, 2010, that second lien lenders could object to a debtor’s bid procedures approved by the first lien lenders despite the terms of an intercreditor agreement inIn re Boston Generating, LLC, No. 10-14419 (SCC) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2010).1 The intercreditor agreement provided the first lien lenders with the “exclusive right to…make determinations regarding the…sale” of the collateral. According to the court, however, the agreement did not expressly preclude the second lien lenders from objecting to bid procedures.

In a recent decision, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware allowed the collateral agent for senior lenders to credit bid for the debtors’ assets even though all of the senior lenders had not authorized the bid. One of the senior lenders had objected to the group’s acquisition of the debtors’ assets by the credit bid. In re GWLS Holdings, Inc., 2009 WL 453110 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 23, 2009) (Walsh, J.).

The buyer of a Chapter 11 debtor's coal supply contract was not liable for the seller's obligations to the sales agent who secured the contract for the debtor-seller, according to a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Al Perry Enterprises, Inc. v. Appalachian Fuels, LLC, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22808 (6th Cir. Sept. 27, 2007). As the court explained, the buyer could not be liable to the sales agent "absent an express assumption of the [debtor's prior] obligations." Id. at *17.

Background

“[A] secured creditor [has no] affirmative obligation under the automatic stay to return a debtor’s [repossessed] collateral to the bankruptcy estate immediately upon notice of the debtor’s bankruptcy,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on Oct. 28, 2019. In re Denby-Peterson, 2019 WL 5538570, *1 (3d Cir. Oct. 28, 2019). Affirming the lower courts, the Third Circuit joined “the minority of our sister courts – the Tenth and D.C. Circuits” with its holding.

“A creditor does not become an insider simply by receiving a claim from a statutory insider,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Feb. 8, 2016. In re The Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 2016 WL 494592, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 2016) (2-1). According to the court, “Insiders are either statutory [per se] [e.g., officers, directors] or non-statutory [de facto].” Id.