On 16 December 2010, HM Treasury published a revised draft of the Financial Markets and Insolvency (Settlement Finality and Financial Collateral Arrangements) (Amendment) Regulations 2010 (SI 2010/2993) (the “Amending Regulations”).  

In Mission Products Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved a question that vexed the lower courts and resulted in a circuit split: does the rejection by a debtor-licensor of a trademark license agreement terminate the licensee’s rights under the rejected license?

Courts generally agree that pre-petition agreements to forgo the protec-tions of bankruptcy are invalid as against public policy. A recent Tenth Cir-cuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decision calls this accepted premise into question by holding that provisions contained in a limited liability company agreement that expressly barred the company, and restricted the manager, from filing a bankruptcy petition were enforceable. DB Capital Holdings, LLC v. Aspen HH Ventures, LLC (In re DB Capital Holdings, LLC), No. 10-046, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 4176 (B.A.P. 10th Cir., Dec.

In trotting a path out of Chapter 11, debtors in most cases will need to engage various key stakeholders, some of whom are not entitled to a distribution in the bankruptcy. As a form of remuneration, non-debtors may insist on receiving a release of liability - not only from claims belonging to the debtor, but also the claims of third-parties - in exchange for their support and contribution to the case.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on June 2, 2010, sitting en banc, overruled its own precedential holding in Avellino & Beines v. M. Frenville Co. (Frenville), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), to hold that in the context of asbestos-related tort claims, a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code arises when an individual is exposed pre-petition to a product giving rise to an injury rather than when the injury manifests itself. JED-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s), No. 1563, slip op. at 18 (3d Cir. June 2, 2010).

The doctrine of substantive consolidation (generally- the power of a bankruptcy court to consolidate the assets and liabilities of affiliated entities in bankruptcy) is a recognized remedy exercised by bankruptcy courts – one that strikes fear into the hearts of many lenders. Justifiably so. The doctrine can be employed to order the substantive consolidation of related-debtor entities in bankruptcy and it can also be employed to substantively consolidate the assets of a debtor in bankruptcy with those of a related entity that is not a debtor in bankruptcy.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on March 17, 2010 held that foreign representatives appointed in a foreign insolvency proceed-ing have the authority to bring a foreign law based avoidance action in an ancillary bankruptcy proceeding commenced under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, reversing the lower court opinions.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held, in a case of first impression in that circuit, that a secured creditor’s failure to turn over collateral repossessed prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition does not violate the automatic stay.

A copy of the opinion inIn re Denby-Peterson is available at: Link to Opinion.

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit recently held that a condominium unit owners association did not violate a debtor’s Chapter 7 discharge order by scheduling a sheriff’s sale to complete a prepetition foreclosure.

Rejecting the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that the in rem foreclosure sale was scheduled to induce payment of discharged pre-petition condominium fees, the Sixth Circuit BAP noted that “all foreclosure litigation potentially can induce payments of discharged debt to avoid a foreclosure sale.”

The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey recently dismissed a debtor’s claims for violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the New Jersey Truth in Consumer Contract Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA), holding the debtor’s failure to schedule his lawsuit as an asset of his bankruptcy estate deprived him of standing to later assert the claims.