The doctrine of substantive consolidation (generally- the power of a bankruptcy court to consolidate the assets and liabilities of affiliated entities in bankruptcy) is a recognized remedy exercised by bankruptcy courts – one that strikes fear into the hearts of many lenders. Justifiably so. The doctrine can be employed to order the substantive consolidation of related-debtor entities in bankruptcy and it can also be employed to substantively consolidate the assets of a debtor in bankruptcy with those of a related entity that is not a debtor in bankruptcy.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on March 17, 2010 held that foreign representatives appointed in a foreign insolvency proceed-ing have the authority to bring a foreign law based avoidance action in an ancillary bankruptcy proceeding commenced under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, reversing the lower court opinions.

In FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP,¹ the Seventh Circuit recently held that transfers are not protected under the safe harbor of section 546(e) of the U.S.

Essentially all securitization structures utilize a bankruptcy remote entity, a/k/a special purpose entity (“SPE”), to reduce the lenders’ or investors’ exposure to a bankruptcy of the sponsor. A standard feature of SPEs is the appointment of an independent person (director, member, manager) to the body managing the SPEs. That independent person’s consent is required for “major decisions,” one of which is the filing of, or consenting to a bankruptcy of the SPE (hence the court’s reference to them as “blocking directors”).

Bankruptcy courts in the U.S. are widely viewed as favorable fora for debtors, trustees and creditors’ committees to pursue creative and difficult causes of actions against deep-pockets lenders and others in an attempt to augment the resources available for distributions to creditors. In yet another case, however, the District Court for the Southern District of New York (after withdrawing the litigation from the bankruptcy court), recently dismissed many of the claims asserted by the Lehman debtors against J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.

The U.S. Supreme Court held that a secured creditor in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case is protected from having its lien “stripped off” even if the collateral securing its claim is worth less than the claims asserted by a senior secured creditor; i.e.the junior creditor’s secured claim is completely "out of the money.” The June 1, 2015 decision, Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett, reaffirmed the Court’s prior holding in Dewsnup v.

When a debtor pays the market cost for goods and services provided to it by third-party vendors, these payments normally cannot be recovered as fraudulent transfers in the U.S. That is because the debtor receives reasonably equivalent value for the payments to its vendors and because the unsuspecting vendors can assert a good faith defense based on the value provided.

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Jaffe v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd.^,1 recently held that a U.S. bankruptcy court is not required under principles of comity to blindly apply foreign law to assets located in the U.S. of a foreign debtor whose principal insolvency proceeding is outside the U.S. Instead, bankruptcy courts must balance the interests of the affected U.S. parties with the those of the foreign debtor. In this case, the balancing required the application of U.S. law to the foreign debtor’s U.S. assets, not German law as applied in the foreign proceeding.

In its recent decision in Meruelo Maddux Properties, Inc.,¹ the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an entity that meets the definition of a “single real estate” debtor under the Bankruptcy Code may not escape the consequences of such designation simply because it is a subsidiary of a group of companies with integrated and intertwined relationships among them. The decision may provide powerful rights not only to lenders to such entities in general, but could significantly enhance the rights of creditors of real estate owning single purpose entities.

The Delaware Bankruptcy Court has confirmed that in multiple-debtor chapter 11 cases, the cramdown rules set forth in section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code must be applied on a per debtor basis as opposed to a per plan basis. See In re JER/Jameson Mezz Borrower II, LLC, No. 11-13338 (MFW), 2011 WL 6749058 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 22, 2011) (“Jameson”) and In re Tribune Co., No. 08-13141 (KJC), 2011 WL 5142420 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 31, 2011) (“Tribune”).