Courts generally agree that pre-petition agreements to forgo the protec-tions of bankruptcy are invalid as against public policy. A recent Tenth Cir-cuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decision calls this accepted premise into question by holding that provisions contained in a limited liability company agreement that expressly barred the company, and restricted the manager, from filing a bankruptcy petition were enforceable. DB Capital Holdings, LLC v. Aspen HH Ventures, LLC (In re DB Capital Holdings, LLC), No. 10-046, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 4176 (B.A.P. 10th Cir., Dec.

In trotting a path out of Chapter 11, debtors in most cases will need to engage various key stakeholders, some of whom are not entitled to a distribution in the bankruptcy. As a form of remuneration, non-debtors may insist on receiving a release of liability - not only from claims belonging to the debtor, but also the claims of third-parties - in exchange for their support and contribution to the case.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on June 2, 2010, sitting en banc, overruled its own precedential holding in Avellino & Beines v. M. Frenville Co. (Frenville), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), to hold that in the context of asbestos-related tort claims, a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code arises when an individual is exposed pre-petition to a product giving rise to an injury rather than when the injury manifests itself. JED-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s), No. 1563, slip op. at 18 (3d Cir. June 2, 2010).

The doctrine of substantive consolidation (generally- the power of a bankruptcy court to consolidate the assets and liabilities of affiliated entities in bankruptcy) is a recognized remedy exercised by bankruptcy courts – one that strikes fear into the hearts of many lenders. Justifiably so. The doctrine can be employed to order the substantive consolidation of related-debtor entities in bankruptcy and it can also be employed to substantively consolidate the assets of a debtor in bankruptcy with those of a related entity that is not a debtor in bankruptcy.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on March 17, 2010 held that foreign representatives appointed in a foreign insolvency proceed-ing have the authority to bring a foreign law based avoidance action in an ancillary bankruptcy proceeding commenced under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, reversing the lower court opinions.

In FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP,¹ the Seventh Circuit recently held that transfers are not protected under the safe harbor of section 546(e) of the U.S.

Essentially all securitization structures utilize a bankruptcy remote entity, a/k/a special purpose entity (“SPE”), to reduce the lenders’ or investors’ exposure to a bankruptcy of the sponsor. A standard feature of SPEs is the appointment of an independent person (director, member, manager) to the body managing the SPEs. That independent person’s consent is required for “major decisions,” one of which is the filing of, or consenting to a bankruptcy of the SPE (hence the court’s reference to them as “blocking directors”).

Bankruptcy courts in the U.S. are widely viewed as favorable fora for debtors, trustees and creditors’ committees to pursue creative and difficult causes of actions against deep-pockets lenders and others in an attempt to augment the resources available for distributions to creditors. In yet another case, however, the District Court for the Southern District of New York (after withdrawing the litigation from the bankruptcy court), recently dismissed many of the claims asserted by the Lehman debtors against J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.

The U.S. Supreme Court held that a secured creditor in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case is protected from having its lien “stripped off” even if the collateral securing its claim is worth less than the claims asserted by a senior secured creditor; i.e.the junior creditor’s secured claim is completely "out of the money.” The June 1, 2015 decision, Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett, reaffirmed the Court’s prior holding in Dewsnup v.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently reversed a bankruptcy court’s ruling that a lender failed to perfect its security interest because its UCC financing statement failed to provide sufficient indication of the secured collateral under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.