The strategic importance of classifying claims and interests under a chapter 11 plan is sometimes an invitation for creative machinations designed to muster adequate support for confirmation of the plan. Although the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally states that only “substantially similar” claims or interests can be classified together, it neither defines “substantial similarity” nor requires that all claims or interests fitting the description be classified together.

The ability to sell assets during the course of a chapter 11 case without incurring transfer taxes customarily levied on such transactions outside of bankruptcy often figures prominently in a potential debtor’s strategic bankruptcy planning. However, the circumstances under which a sale and related transactions (e.g., recording of mortgages) qualify for the tax exemption have been a focal point of dispute for many courts, including no less than four circuit courts of appeal.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has issued a recent decision that is instructive as to what creditors should not do when a customer is having a hard time paying its bills.

Assignee creditors are protected by the provision of the Bankruptcy Code that prevents debtors from obtaining a discharge for debts obtained through fraud, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held.

A recent decision from the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York has rendered the enforcement of reclamation claims that arose 20 days prior to the bankruptcy filing almost impossible in cases in which there is a prepetition lien on inventory.

In In re Dana Corp., 2007 WL 1199221 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2007) there was $300 million in reclamation claims asserted, but the debtor estimated that valid reclamation claims totaled only approximately $3 million.

Though the shareholders of a corporation did not sign a corporate sale agreement, they were considered to be the sellers of the corporation, and therefore were entitled to avail themselves of the indemnification provisions under the agreement, ruled the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See In re NuNet, Inc., 348 B.R. 300 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held that a debtor’s interest in its liquor license constitutes property of the estate pursuant to section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The First Circuit further held that the debtor’s rejection of its lease ended the debtor’s contractual right to continued use of its liquor license, and left the landlord with ordinary remedies for breach of contract—such as specific performance to obtain recovery of the license. See In re Ground Round, Inc. (Abboud v. Ground Round), 482 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2007).

While derivations of intercreditor agreements continue to enhance the rights of the senior secured party, whether the many provisions provided for are enforceable in bankruptcy remains a burning question. Recently, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia in In re Aerosol Packaging, LLC, 2006 WL 4030176 (Bankr. N.D.Ga. 2006) helped bring clarity to one of the most important of these issues: is the right of a senior creditor to vote the claim of a junior creditor on whether to accept or reject a plan of reorganization enforceable in bankruptcy?

Debtors, creditors, purchasers and lenders continue to carefully monitor employee incentive programs after the 2005 changes to Bankruptcy Code brought on by BAPCA. Although many feared the changes to section 503(c) would eliminate an important tool for creating incentives for employees, courts have consistently approved reasonable and well-thought-out incentive programs.

Factual Background

In Motorola, Inc. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007), the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”) and the debtors’ lenders sought approval of a settlement prior to confirmation of a plan of reorganization. While the Court concluded that many aspects of the settlement might otherwise be approved, it found that a provision that distributed funds in violation of the absolute priority rule lacked sufficient justification.