The United States Supreme Court recently submitted to Congress an amendment to Bankruptcy Rule 2019 dealing with disclosure by groups of hedge funds and other distressed investors in reorganization cases. Unless Congress blocks its passage, which is unlikely, the amendment will become effective on Dec. 1, 2011.1 As shown below, the new rule streamlines and clarifies what had become a frequently litigated disclosure process.

Background

In Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc. v. Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1 Limited (In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.), Adv. P. No. 09-01032 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011) [hereinafter “Ballyrock”], the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a contractual provision that subordinates the priority of a termination payment owing under a credit default swap (CDS) to a debtor in bankruptcy, and which caps the amount of the termination payment, may be an unenforceable ipso facto clause under section 541(c)(1)(B).

Summary

In a 56 page opinion published June 9, 2011, Judge Walsh ruled that a method of operating in which all of the credits and debits between two companies were netted out allows this same method to be used in calculating a set-off defense in preference litigation. Judge Walsh’s opinion is available here (the “Opinion”).

Background

On June 28, 2011, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected the views of the Third Circuit and the Fifth Circuit and held that a reorganization plan which proposes the sale of encumbered assets free and clear of liens must honor the secured creditor’s right to credit bid its claim in order to be confirmed under the “fair and equitable” standard of the Bankruptcy Code. In the combined appeals of In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, et al. andIn re Radlax Gateway Hotel, LLC, et al.

A Delaware bankruptcy judge recently held that a landlord's right of first refusal to purchase a debtor/tenant's liquor license (the "Option") was unenforceable since the debtor rejected the lease containing the Option1. Disagreeing with a ruling of the First Circuit Court of Appeals2, the Delaware court held that the Option provision was a non-severable part of an executory contract that was not subject to specific performance.

The Facts

Summary

In an 11 page opinion published June 14, 2011, Judge Walrath ruled that a Chapter 7 Trustee’s lack of specificity in pleading a preference action was grounds for dismissal under FRCP 12(b)(6). Judge Walrath’s opinion is available here (the “Opinion”).

Background

In a decision that may have significant practical implications to the practice of bankruptcy law, the U.S. Supreme Court recently declared, on constitutional grounds, that a bankruptcy court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a debtor’s state law counterclaims, thus considerably limiting the ability of the bankruptcy court to fully and finally adjudicate claims in a bankruptcy case. Stern v. Marshall, No. 10-179 (June 23, 2011).

On June 28, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that secured creditors have a statutory right to credit bid1 their debt at an asset sale conducted under a "cramdown" plan. In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, ___ F.3d. ___, 2011 WL 2547615 (7th Cir. June 28, 2011).2 The Seventh Circuit's decision creates a split with recent decisions in the Third and Fifth Circuits regarding a lender's ability to credit bid its secured debt. See In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Pacific Lumber, Co., 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued its much anticipated decision in In Re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, __ F.3d __ (7th Cir., June 28, 2011). In the closely watched case, the Seventh Circuit declined to follow the Third Circuit’s decision in Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010), holding instead that secured lenders have the right to credit bid in “free and clear” asset sales where their liens are being stripped, whether those sales occur under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code or under a chapter 11 plan.

Debtors filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7.  The Debtors own and have title to real property ("Property").  Prior to the Petition Date, the husband borrowed $85,000 from Lender. This loan was reflected by a promissory note signed only by the husband, as "Borrower."  The term "Note" is defined in the Mortgage as the promissory note signed by Borrower.  On the same date, a mortgage granting Lender a mortgage on the Property was executed.