In Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc. v. Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1 Limited (In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.), Adv. P. No. 09-01032 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011) [hereinafter “Ballyrock”], the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a contractual provision that subordinates the priority of a termination payment owing under a credit default swap (CDS) to a debtor in bankruptcy, and which caps the amount of the termination payment, may be an unenforceable ipso facto clause under section 541(c)(1)(B).

On June 23rd, the First Circuit addressed the priority of claims asserted by senior noteholders and junior noteholders of debt issued by an insolvent bank. It affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding that the parties did not intend for the senior noteholders to receive post-petition interest payments prior to the junior noteholders receiving a distribution. In re: Bank of New England Corporation, Debtor.  

As revealed in a recent bankruptcy case, purchasers of contaminated property need to have a very clear understanding of their contractual remedies before proceeding with self-help. The case (In re Evans Industries, Inc., No.

Earlier this year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a proposed “gifting” plan distributing value from the second lien lenders to the prepetition equity holder violated the absolute priority rule and was confirmed in error.2 This decision, by a 2-1 panel vote,3 reversed the decisions of the Bankruptcy and District Courts for the Southern District of New York. The Second Circuit also affirmed unanimously the designation of the vote of an indirect competitor of the debtor that held no claims prior to the petition date.

Summary

In a 56 page opinion published June 9, 2011, Judge Walsh ruled that a method of operating in which all of the credits and debits between two companies were netted out allows this same method to be used in calculating a set-off defense in preference litigation. Judge Walsh’s opinion is available here (the “Opinion”).

Background

On June 28, 2011, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected the views of the Third Circuit and the Fifth Circuit and held that a reorganization plan which proposes the sale of encumbered assets free and clear of liens must honor the secured creditor’s right to credit bid its claim in order to be confirmed under the “fair and equitable” standard of the Bankruptcy Code. In the combined appeals of In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, et al. andIn re Radlax Gateway Hotel, LLC, et al.

A Delaware bankruptcy judge recently held that a landlord's right of first refusal to purchase a debtor/tenant's liquor license (the "Option") was unenforceable since the debtor rejected the lease containing the Option1. Disagreeing with a ruling of the First Circuit Court of Appeals2, the Delaware court held that the Option provision was a non-severable part of an executory contract that was not subject to specific performance.

The Facts

On June 28, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that secured creditors have a statutory right to credit bid1 their debt at an asset sale conducted under a "cramdown" plan. In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, ___ F.3d. ___, 2011 WL 2547615 (7th Cir. June 28, 2011).2 The Seventh Circuit's decision creates a split with recent decisions in the Third and Fifth Circuits regarding a lender's ability to credit bid its secured debt. See In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Pacific Lumber, Co., 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued its much anticipated decision in In Re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, __ F.3d __ (7th Cir., June 28, 2011). In the closely watched case, the Seventh Circuit declined to follow the Third Circuit’s decision in Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010), holding instead that secured lenders have the right to credit bid in “free and clear” asset sales where their liens are being stripped, whether those sales occur under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code or under a chapter 11 plan.

Debtors filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7.  The Debtors own and have title to real property ("Property").  Prior to the Petition Date, the husband borrowed $85,000 from Lender. This loan was reflected by a promissory note signed only by the husband, as "Borrower."  The term "Note" is defined in the Mortgage as the promissory note signed by Borrower.  On the same date, a mortgage granting Lender a mortgage on the Property was executed.