Although it has been described as an “extraordinary remedy,” the ability of a bankruptcy court to order the substantive consolidation of related debtor-entities in bankruptcy (if circumstances so dictate) is relatively uncontroversial, as an appropriate exercise of a bankruptcy court’s broad (albeit nonstatutory) equitable powers. By contrast, considerable controversy surrounds the far less common practice of ordering consolidation of a debtor in bankruptcy with a nondebtor.

Last month, the United States Court of Appeals in two separate circuits held that liability insurers have standing as parties in interest to appear and be heard in an insured's Chapter 11 case where the insurer might be liable to indemnify the claims of the insured's creditors.

Prior to the 1984 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code1 (BAFJA), there was a split as to whether a transfer of title to real estate by virtue of a mortgage foreclosure constituted a transfer as defined in §101 of the Bankruptcy Code.2, 3 However, BAFJA made it clear that a “transfer” included “the foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of redemption.”4 This change in definition has a significant impact on the application of both §547 (preference) and §548 (fraudulent transfer).  

The second priority lien held by a junior lien holder is a property interest sufficient to trigger the protection of the automatic stay.In re Three Strokes L.P., 379 B.R. 804 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2008). Inasmuch as a senior lien holder’s foreclosure proceedings would have the effect of extinguishing the debtor’s second lien interest, a court may only lift the stay and permit the foreclosure to proceed upon such senior lien holder’s showing of adequate protection.

The Seventh Circuit recently decided that a mortgage that assigns future rental income to the mortgagee creates a security interest that takes priority over a federal tax lien.  Bloomfield State Bank v. United States, No.

Earlier this year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided in In re Lett that objections to a bankruptcy court’s approval of a cram-down chapter 11 plan on the basis of noncompliance with the “absolute priority rule” may be raised for the first time on appeal. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that “[a] bankruptcy court has an independent obligation to ensure that a proposed plan complies with [the] absolute priority rule before ‘cramming’ that plan down upon dissenting creditor classes,” whether or not stakeholders “formally” object on that basis.

In the fallout of recent commercial mortgage-backed securities defaults, mortgage servicers have increasingly used receivership sales for commercial real estate assets, including last month’s sale of the Davis Building in downtown Dallas.

In a ruling that has been described as “very important” and the “first decision of its kind,” bankruptcy judge Shelley C. Chapman of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held on April 1, 2011, in In re Innkeepers USA Trust, 2011 WL 1206173 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

Section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code delineates categories of claims that are entitled to elevated priority as “administrative expenses.” Under section 503(b)(3)(D), administrative expenses include “actual, necessary expenses” incurred by a creditor, indenture trustee, equity holder, or unofficial committee “in making a substantial contribution” in a chapter 11 case.

ReGen Capital I, Inc. v. UAL Corporation, et al., (In the Matter of UAL Corporation, et al.), 635 F.3d 312 (7th Cir. 2011).

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