A Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) of the Tenth Circuit recently upheld a bankruptcy court’s dismissal of an LLC’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on the ground that the LLC’s operating agreement barred the LLC from filing for bankruptcy. DB Capital Holdings, LLC v. Aspen HH Ventures, LLC (In re DB Capital Holdings, LLC), No. CO-10-046, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 4176 (B.A.P. 10th Cir., Dec. 6, 2010).
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit (BAP) recently held that a mortgagee that held a collateral assignment of rents on property in which the debtor had no equity was not adequately protected by cash collateral orders entered by the bankruptcy court that granted the lender a "replacement lien" on post-petition rents.
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes a receivership process by which the FDIC can engage in an orderly liquidation process to wind down the affairs of and liquidate the assets of certain failing financial companies that pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the United States.
The current "Great Recession," which began in late 2007 with a maelstrom in the debt capital markets, has necessitated a rethinking of the federal income tax rules governing debt restructurings. The harsh rules2 promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in reaction to the 1991 taxpayer-favorable decision in Cottage Savings v. Commissioner,3 have been inhibiting restructurings. Instead, rules that did not trigger adverse tax results have been needed to induce lenders and borrowers to restructure obligations that can no longer be paid according to their terms.
- Introduction
Congress enacted the current Bankruptcy Code, Sections 101 through 1502 of Title Eleven of the United States Code (as amended, the “Bankruptcy Code”), in 1978, and it took effect late in 1979. Many important federal environmental statutes were enacted around the same time, e.g., Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) in 1980. Thus, Congress did not fully consider environmental liability schemes when it created the bankruptcy code.
The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that a creditor of a bankrupt corporation may assert alter ego claims against the corporation’s sole shareholders. The California Court of Appeals for the Second Appellate District not only supports the Ninth Circuit’s decision but has recently taken it one step further, holding that alter ego allegations are not even subject to the automatic bankruptcy stay.
On December 23, 2010, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the 6th Circuit, upheld the Eastern District of Kentucky’s Bankruptcy Court’s order that post petition rents, revenues or other funds derived from leased real property is property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. §541 and can be used as cash collateral under 11 U.S.C. §363. However, post petition rents can be used as cash collateral only if the debtor can provide adequate protection for the use of those rents through an existing equity cushion in the property.
Section 507(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that if a secured creditor receives “adequate protection” for its interest in collateral held by a debtor, but that adequate protection ultimately proves insufficient, then the creditor is entitled to a “superpriority” administrative expense claim sufficient to cover any uncompensated diminution in the value of that collateral.
It is well established that the automatic stay imposed under section 362 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) in a typical bankruptcy case applies extraterritorially. Thus, creditors of a Chapter 11 debtor are generally prohibited from exercising any remedies against a debtor or its assets anywhere in the world. Up until recently, no court had addressed the scope of the stay applicable in a Chapter 15 case.
Recently, a Colorado bankruptcy court considered for the first time the effects of Bankruptcy Code Section 552 on a lender’s security interest in the proceeds of an FCC broadcast license. The court held that a prepetition security interest would not extend to proceeds received from a post-petition transfer of the debtor’s FCC license because the debtor did not have an attachable, prepetition property interest in the proceeds. Such an interest does not arise until the FCC approves an agreement to sell the license.