On November 10 we posted to Basis Points a blog concerning a Delaware Bankruptcy Court decision (In re Universal Building Products) that fired a warning shot across the bows of professionals who solicit Creditors’ Committee proxies from non-clients of their firms (here is the blog).

With the flood of debt-heavy capital structures created over the past decade, bankruptcy courts have been left to clean up the remnants of many failed transactions. Given the volume of debt provided, courts are likely to continue to be called upon to determine the relative rights of creditors that result from multi-tiered debt structures.

In nearly every bankruptcy proceeding there is some constituency that ends up having its claim or interest impaired. Not surprisingly, therefore, these same constituencies would like to avoid that outcome by restricting the debtor’s ability to commence bankruptcy in the first place.

A debtor's decision to assume or reject an executory contract is typically given deferential treatment by bankruptcy courts under a "business judgment" standard. Certain types of nondebtor parties to such contracts, however, have been afforded special protections. For example, in 1988, Congress added section 365(n) to the Bankruptcy Code, granting some intellectual property licensees the right to continued use of licensed property, notwithstanding a debtor's rejection of the underlying license agreement.

The "common interest" doctrine allows attorneys representing different clients with aligned legal interests to share information and documents without waiving the work-product doctrine or attorney-client privilege. Issues involving the common-interest doctrine often arise during the course of a business restructuring, because restructurings tend to involve various constituencies, including the company, the official committee of unsecured creditors, secured debt holders, other creditors, and equity holders whose legal interests may be aligned at any one time.

The early 2000s witnessed a wave of chapter 11 filings by entities with liability for asbestos personal-injury claims. The large number of filings was matched by the variety of legal strategies that companies pursued to address their asbestos liabilities in chapter 11. The chapter 11 case of Quigley Company, Inc. ("Quigley"), was one of the last large asbestos cases to file in the 2000s and represents one of the more interesting strategies for dealing with asbestos liabilities in chapter 11.

In Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., --- S.Ct. ----, 2011 WL 66438 (U.S. 2011), the United States Supreme Court took up the question of whether a Chapter 13 debtor who owns his or her vehicle outright (“free and clear”) may claim an allowance for car ownership costs and thereby reduce the amount that he or she will repay creditors. In her first opinion, Justice Kagan answered simply—no. The Ransom opinion has been seen as a victory for not only credit card companies like the one involved but other creditors, as well.

The United States Bankruptcy Court recently denied confirmation of a bankruptcy plan even though it found that the plan's global settlement was "fair and reasonable."1 Why? Because the plan's releases were too broad and "unreasonable" for many of the constituents. The case provides a pointed lesson to creditors and debtors alike — pay attention to the releases; overdoing it may sink the whole ship.

A Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) of the Tenth Circuit recently upheld a bankruptcy court’s dismissal of an LLC’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on the ground that the LLC’s operating agreement barred the LLC from filing for bankruptcy. DB Capital Holdings, LLC v. Aspen HH Ventures, LLC (In re DB Capital Holdings, LLC), No. CO-10-046, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 4176 (B.A.P. 10th Cir., Dec. 6, 2010).

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit (BAP) recently held that a mortgagee that held a collateral assignment of rents on property in which the debtor had no equity was not adequately protected by cash collateral orders entered by the bankruptcy court that granted the lender a "replacement lien" on post-petition rents.