Introduction
Many landlords are very familiar with provisions of the United States Bankruptcy Code dealing with assumption and rejection of leases. However, the particular consequences of lease rejection may not be as well known. For example, once a lease is rejected or deemed to be rejected, a landlord may not know its rights with respect to regaining possession of the leased premises. A recent case from a Florida bankruptcy court shed some light on this issue when it held that after a debtor has rejected a lease, the tenant must surrender the premises to the landlord.
INTRODUCTION
Companies that plan to sell goods or services to a debtor in bankruptcy should be aware of a recent case decided by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, holding that a trustee may avoid a debtor’s post-petition transfers of cash collateral if such transfers were made without the consent of the secured party or court order.1
On June 2, 2010, the Third Circuit overruled longstanding precedent interpreting the definition of a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code. In JELD-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s Inc.), No. 09-1563, slip op., (3d Cir. June 2, 2010) an en banc panel rejected the state law accrual theory of claims recognition established in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (Matter of M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), in favor of the more widely followed conduct test theory.
A. United States v. Delfasco, Inc., 409 B.R. 704 (D. Del. July 15, 2009).
This suit involved a motion to withdraw from Bankruptcy Court to District Court. Defendant/Debtor Delfasco, Inc. (“Delfasco”) filed for Chapter 11 protection under the Bankruptcy Code following the EPA’s issuance of a RCRA Order requiring Delfasco to install and maintain mitigation systems for trichloroethylene that it discovered on its property. The United States, on behalf of the EPA, filed an Adversary Complaint against Delfasco, followed by this motion to withdraw.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on June 2, 2010, sitting en banc, overruled its own precedential holding in Avellino & Beines v. M. Frenville Co. (Frenville), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), to hold that in the context of asbestos-related tort claims, a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code arises when an individual is exposed pre-petition to a product giving rise to an injury rather than when the injury manifests itself. JED-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s), No. 1563, slip op. at 18 (3d Cir. June 2, 2010).
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York recently addressed an objection to the debtor-in-possession financing approved by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in the bankruptcy of General Growth Properties.1 The District Court’s decision, which holds that reversal on appeal of an order approving DIP financing does not invalidate the financing or liens granted by the postpetition lenders, if provided in good faith also addresses both the timeliness of the appeal and the merits of the arguments raised therein, provides a detai
A “roll-up” is a form of postpetition financing which has the effect of elevating the priority of prepetition debt. In a roll-up, the prepetition debt of the postpetition, new money lenders is rolled into the debtor in possession financing, thus affording the prepetition debt superpriority status and, in many circumstances, ensuring the rolled-up debt is paid in full on the effective date of the plan of reorganization, (unless the lender consents to different treatment under the plan).1