Many landlords are very familiar with provisions of the United States Bankruptcy Code dealing with assumption and rejection of leases. However, the particular consequences of lease rejection may not be as well known. For example, once a lease is rejected or deemed to be rejected, a landlord may not know its rights with respect to regaining possession of the leased premises. A recent case from a Florida bankruptcy court shed some light on this issue when it held that after a debtor has rejected a lease, the tenant must surrender the premises to the landlord.

Introduction

On May 31, 2010, Specialty Products Holding Corp ("SPHC" or the "Debtor"), filed for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. This post is one of two posts regarding the SPHC bankruptcy. The first post will look at the Debtor's businesses and events leading up to the bankruptcy filing, while a second post will look at how SPHC intends to deal with the large volume of asbestos claims that forced it to file for bankruptcy.

The Third Circuit recently held that a bankruptcy court may confirm a Chapter 11 plan that includes a sale of assets in which secured creditors are not permitted to “credit bid” for the assets. In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010). In that case, the debtors in possession, companies that own and operate the Philadelphia Inquirer and Philadelphia Daily News, moved the bankruptcy court to approve bid procedures for an auction of the debtors’ assets. Id. at 302.

The comprehensive financial reform bill recently passed by the Senate1 creates a new “orderly liquidation authority” (“OLA”) that would allow the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) to seize control of a financial company2 whose imminent collapse is determined to threaten the financial system as a whole.

Introduction

INTRODUCTION

Companies that plan to sell goods or services to a debtor in bankruptcy should be aware of a recent case decided by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, holding that a trustee may avoid a debtor’s post-petition transfers of cash collateral if such transfers were made without the consent of the secured party or court order.1

On June 2, 2010, the Third Circuit overruled longstanding precedent interpreting the definition of a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code. In JELD-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s Inc.), No. 09-1563, slip op., (3d Cir. June 2, 2010) an en banc panel rejected the state law accrual theory of claims recognition established in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (Matter of M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), in favor of the more widely followed conduct test theory.

A. United States v. Delfasco, Inc., 409 B.R. 704 (D. Del. July 15, 2009).

This suit involved a motion to withdraw from Bankruptcy Court to District Court. Defendant/Debtor Delfasco, Inc. (“Delfasco”) filed for Chapter 11 protection under the Bankruptcy Code following the EPA’s issuance of a RCRA Order requiring Delfasco to install and maintain mitigation systems for trichloroethylene that it discovered on its property. The United States, on behalf of the EPA, filed an Adversary Complaint against Delfasco, followed by this motion to withdraw.  

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on June 2, 2010, sitting en banc, overruled its own precedential holding in Avellino & Beines v. M. Frenville Co. (Frenville), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), to hold that in the context of asbestos-related tort claims, a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code arises when an individual is exposed pre-petition to a product giving rise to an injury rather than when the injury manifests itself. JED-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s), No. 1563, slip op. at 18 (3d Cir. June 2, 2010).