Seeking to have an independent examiner investigate a debtor or its management can be a powerful tool available to creditors and other interested parties in a bankruptcy case. Typically, a party might request that an examiner be appointed if the debtor or its management is suspected of fraud or other misconduct. The low cost associated with making the request, together with recent positive outcomes for requesting creditors, may help to increasingly popularize the use of examiner requests by parties seeking leverage in bankruptcy plan negotiations.
In today’s difficult economic environment, it is vital for trade vendors faced with customers’ bankruptcies to have optimal strategies for collecting invoices for past shipments and protecting prior payments from being clawed back by a bankruptcy estate as preferences. The need for such strategies will only increase as record amounts of corporate debt mature. Nelson D. Schwartz, Corporate Debt Coming Due May Squeeze Credit, N.Y.
The recent financial collapse has provided a strategic opportunity for healthy financial institutions, and non-traditional investors, to capitalize on the misfortune of failing banks. The FDIC is accelerating this process by revamping its loss share program. This program gives prospective buyers of failing institutions billions of dollars in government guarantees for risking the purchase of a failing bank, inclusive of all “toxic” assets.
A bankruptcy court recently held that in order for a supplier of goods on credit to establish an administrative claim under Bankruptcy Code section 503(b)(9) in the bankruptcy case of its buyer, the supplier will need to show that its buyer "physically" received the goods within 20 days prior to the buyer's bankruptcy filing, regardless of when title to the goods passed. In Re Circuit City Stores, Inc., et al., Case No. 08-35653, No. 7149 (Bankr. E.D. VA April 8, 2010).
In In re Kohls, 2007 LEXIS 76 (Bankr NDWVa 2007), the debtor filed this adversary proceeding against the Bank to cancel indebtedness and recover damages related to a $34,864 loan that the Bank made to the Debtor on the grounds that the loan was unconscionable at the time it was executed in violation of W. Va. Code § 46A-2-121.
Credit bidding has become a really hot issue recently. For those of us who don't normally work on bankruptcy matters, the right to credit bid is an important right that secured lenders usually have in a bankruptcy proceeding. If you're the senior secured lender and you want to buy the company's assets in a bankruptcy sale, you can show up at the auction and, instead of bidding cash, you can place credit bids.
Many bankruptcy practitioners are familiar with the general tenet that an obligation secured only by a mortgage on the Debtor’s principal residence is immune from modification or avoidance by the Debtor. Sections 1123(b)(5) and 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code protect residential mortgages from being “stripped-down” to the value of the subject real estate or subjecting the terms of the underlying obligation to modification.
On May 5, 2009, Judge James Peck, the Bankruptcy Judge in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy cases, held that the safe harbor provisions of the Bankruptcy Code do not override the mutuality requirements for setoff under section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. As a consequence, the Bankruptcy Court prohibited Swedbank, a non-debtor counter party to a swap agreement, from setting off pre-petition claims against Lehman against funds collected for Lehman’s account postpetition. See In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Bankr. Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
On May 5, 2010, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision declaring that a party’s right to setoff in an ISDA Master Agreement is unenforceable in bankruptcy unless strict mutuality exists. (Decision and Order).
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently issued an opinion in the case of In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. that significantly restricts the scope of setoff rights for energy traders and other participants in derivatives and forward commodity markets. Traditionally, bankruptcy law has required mutuality between the debtor and a creditor as a prerequisite for the exercise of setoff rights by the creditor.