Smart Summary for Commercial Landlords

So you are chugging along with a foreclosure action (either on real and/or personal property) only to be stopped in your tracks by the borrower filing a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The usual, immediate thought is – “better contact our bankruptcy counsel to obtain relief from the automatic stay.” Well, perhaps, or perhaps you might want to contact the Chapter 7 Trustee first (either directly or through your bankruptcy counsel). Why? Maybe the Chapter 7 Trustee would be interested in liquidating that collateral for you though the bankruptcy system.

(Bankr. W.D. Ky. May 17, 2016)

On May 16, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, No. 15-145, holding that the "actual fraud" bar to discharge under section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code encompasses an individual debtor's knowing receipt of fraudulently transferred property.

Statutory Background

On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down its opinion in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, Case No. 15-145.

In our latest installment of “Breaking the Code”, we take a look at a common section of the Bankruptcy Code that comes up in nearly every chapter 11 case: section 365(a). Section 365 contains one of the most powerful rights conferred upon a chapter 11 Debtor: the right to take a step back, evaluate its contracts and leases, and assume profitable agreements while rejecting unprofitable agreements.

A Supreme Court ruling this week should give creditors a powerful tool to collect their debts from debtors who try to transfer assets before seeking bankruptcy protection. The primary reason an individual may turn to personal bankruptcy is to protect assets from creditor collection while obtaining a “discharge” from debts. Such protection is increasingly necessary where an individual is being pursued by one or more creditors, particularly where those creditors may have obtained (or are about to obtain) judgments against the individual.

In a favorable ruling to creditors and bankruptcy trustees, SCOTUS issued its ruling yesterday in Husky Int'l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz) addressing a circuit split on whether “actual fraud” requires a debtor in bankruptcy to have made a false representation. The 7-1 majority found that “actual fraud” under §523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code to encompass fraudulent conveyance schemes, even when those schemes do not involve a false representation.

Today we’ll begin with a two-part question: When do you suppose you could (i) hold a debtor’s property hostage without running afoul of the automatic stay and (ii) also collect on an administrative expense for postpetition rent for leased space used to store such property?

If you don’t already know the answers to the above questions, perhaps an overview of a recent decision from the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey will provide some insight.

On April 15, 2016, the IRS released a generic legal advice memorandum (GLAM 2016-001) (the “April GLAM”) addressing the impact of so-called “bad boy” guarantees (also known as nonrecourse carve-out guarantees) on the characterization of underlying partnership debt as recourse vs. nonrecourse under Section 752 of the Internal Revenue Code.