(Published in the Spring 2016 issue of The Bankers' Statement)
Introduction
On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down its opinion in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, Case No. 15-145.
In our latest installment of “Breaking the Code”, we take a look at a common section of the Bankruptcy Code that comes up in nearly every chapter 11 case: section 365(a). Section 365 contains one of the most powerful rights conferred upon a chapter 11 Debtor: the right to take a step back, evaluate its contracts and leases, and assume profitable agreements while rejecting unprofitable agreements.
A Supreme Court ruling this week should give creditors a powerful tool to collect their debts from debtors who try to transfer assets before seeking bankruptcy protection. The primary reason an individual may turn to personal bankruptcy is to protect assets from creditor collection while obtaining a “discharge” from debts. Such protection is increasingly necessary where an individual is being pursued by one or more creditors, particularly where those creditors may have obtained (or are about to obtain) judgments against the individual.
In a favorable ruling to creditors and bankruptcy trustees, SCOTUS issued its ruling yesterday in Husky Int'l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz) addressing a circuit split on whether “actual fraud” requires a debtor in bankruptcy to have made a false representation. The 7-1 majority found that “actual fraud” under §523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code to encompass fraudulent conveyance schemes, even when those schemes do not involve a false representation.
Today we’ll begin with a two-part question: When do you suppose you could (i) hold a debtor’s property hostage without running afoul of the automatic stay and (ii) also collect on an administrative expense for postpetition rent for leased space used to store such property?
If you don’t already know the answers to the above questions, perhaps an overview of a recent decision from the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey will provide some insight.
On April 15, 2016, the IRS released a generic legal advice memorandum (GLAM 2016-001) (the “April GLAM”) addressing the impact of so-called “bad boy” guarantees (also known as nonrecourse carve-out guarantees) on the characterization of underlying partnership debt as recourse vs. nonrecourse under Section 752 of the Internal Revenue Code.
(6th Cir. B.A.P. May 11, 2016)
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reverses the bankruptcy court’s order allowing the unsecured creditor’s late-filed claim in this Chapter 13 case. The creditor filed its claim eight days after the bar date, and the bankruptcy court allowed the claim based on excusable neglect. The B.A.P. holds that a bankruptcy court does not have authority to extend the deadline in Rule 3002(c) through equitable powers or the doctrine of equitable tolling. Opinion below.
Judge: Humphrey
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, (“the Court”) held in In re John Joseph Louis Johnson, III, Case No. 14-57104, 2016 WL 1719149, that a creditor violated the automatic stay by seeking to enforce an arbitration award against nondebtor co-defendants. The automatic stay applies not only to stay actions against the debtor personally but also prohibits “any act to … exercise control over property of the [debtor’s bankruptcy] estate.” 11 U.S.C.
Lovers of Shakespeare will no doubt recognise the aforesaid phrase. As this is Shakespeare’s 400th birthday year, I thought it apt to borrow one of his most famous phrases.
The use of Shakespeare in a legal article may appear to many readers misplaced. However, the expression does, in my view, capture a serious dilemma facing creditors when trying to invoke what appears to be a cost-effective and quick way of recovering money.