An Illinois appellate court, applying Indiana and federal law, has held that neither a bankruptcy exclusion nor an insured versus insured exclusion applied to bar coverage for claims brought by a bankruptcy trustee.  Yessenow v. Exec. Risk Indem., Inc., 2011 WL 2623307 (Ill. App. Ct. June 30, 2011).

The ability to sell an asset in bankruptcy free and clear of liens and any other competing “interest” is a well-recognized tool available to a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”). Whether the category of “interests” encompassed by that power extends to potential successor liability claims, however, has been the subject of considerable debate in the courts. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this controversial issue in Olson v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 445 B.R. 243(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).

In a recent ruling likely to be of great interest to debtors and creditors alike, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia (the “Court”) ruled in MC Asset Recovery v. Southern Company1 (the “Southern Co. Litigation”) that fraudulent transfer claims held by a bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession under the Bankruptcy Code continue to be viable at the conclusion of a bankruptcy case, even if all creditors’ claims have already been satisfied in full pursuant to a plan of reorganization.

The latest in a line of fraudulent transfer decisions in the Madoff case has added to the case-law regarding what level of knowledge is needed to plead actual fraud in securities Ponzi scheme cases.

What showing must creditors make to be granted the right to prosecute claims on behalf of the bankruptcy estate?

In a unanimous decision arising out of the Tribune Media Company bankruptcy cases, a panel of the Second Circuit held that the safe harbor under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, which precludes avoidance of certain transfers by a

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently ruled that constructive fraudulent conveyance claims arising under state law are preempted by the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (Code), where the transfers were made by or to financial intermediaries effectuating settlement payments in securities transactions or made in connection with a securities contract, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is a debtor in possession, bankruptcy trustee or other creditors’ representative.

Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code trusts a debtor in possession to operate its business.  In general, a debtor in possession “is free to use, sell[,] or lease property of the . . . estate in the operation of the debtor’s business.”1  This discretion is “at the heart” of the powers of a debtor in possession, 2  and courts are reluctant “to interfere, or to permit other parties in interest to interfere, in the making of routine, day-to-day business decisions.” 3  Therefore, a court will not disturb

A district court judge in the Middle District of Pennsylvania recently vacated a bankruptcy court’s decision allowing rejection of an oil and gas lease under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.  The District Court held that a debtor’s oil and gas lease was a conveyance of an interest in real property and not an executory contract or unexpired lease that could be rejected in bankruptcy under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.

In a case of apparent first impression, U.S. District Court Judge Alan S. Gold recently held in In re Wellington Vision, Inc., No. 06-80446, __ B.R. ___, 2007 WL 762398 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 20, 2007), that a franchisee in chapter 11 cannot assume (i.e., retain) a franchise agreement that grants a nonexclusive trademark license, leaving the franchisor free to terminate the agreement.