On May 4, 2015, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued an important decision regarding creditor standing to maintain a derivative action on behalf of an insolvent corporation. In Quadrant Structured Products Company v. Vertin et al., C.A. No.
In Quadrant Structured Products Co. v. Vertin, 2015 WL 2062115 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2015), the Delaware Court of Chancery (Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster) announced a bright-line standard governing the threshold inquiry of when a creditor can maintain a derivative suit against directors for breach of fiduciary duty. The court held that a creditor need only establish that the company was balance sheet insolvent at the time the suit was filed and that the creditor’s standing will not be extinguished if the company rides back into solvency during the litigation.
In Quadrant Structured Products Co. v. Vertin, C.A. No. 6990-VCL, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 193 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2014), the Delaware Court of Chancery held that when creditors of insolvent firms assert derivative claims, they need not meet the contemporaneous ownership requirement applied to stockholder-plaintiffs.
The Federal Reserve has issued an interim final rule clarifying the treatment of uninsured U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks under Section 716 of the Dodd-Frank Act ("Swaps Pushout Rule"). The interim final rule clarifies that, for purposes of the Swaps Pushout Rule, all uninsured U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks are treated as insured depository institutions.
On April 9, 2013, Ambac Financial Group, Inc. (“Ambac”) submitted a proposed settlement with the United States to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. If approved, the proposed settlement would resolve more than two years of litigation concerning the tax treatment of losses sustained by Ambac in connection with credit default swap contracts entered into during the 2008 financial crisis. The settlement would result in a payment by Ambac to the Government of $101.9 million, as well as possible future additional payments of up to $14.9 million.
Pursuant to Section 113 of Dodd- Frank aimed at avoiding a repeat of the Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008, the Federal Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) issued a proposed rule establishing a three-stage analysis for identifying non bank systemically important financial institutions.
Adjustable rate mortgages began to reset just as the economic outlook for subprime borrowers soured. Defaults on subprime debt inevitably followed. The onslaught of litigation against all players in the subprime lending arena followed just as inevitably.
The rapid growth in derivatives as hedging instruments, particularly through equity swaps, credit default swaps ("CDS") and loan credit default swaps ("LCDS"), has challenged fundamental assumptions underlying corporate governance law, federal shareholder disclosure requirements and bankruptcy law. Corporate law has long relied on a "one share one vote" model, which presumes that a shareholder's economic interests in a corporation are inextricably linked to their voting power.
The credit default swap (“CDS”) has never been tested in bankruptcy proceedings on any significant scale, particularly under recent amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. In part, this is because the CDS market is a very recent phenomenon. CDS market participants also make considerable efforts to avoid holding a credit default swap where the counterparty has gone into bankruptcy.
Many clients have asked us for guidance as to the basic mechanics of dealing with the Lehman bankruptcy. Although this list is not exhaustive, we have set forth below some of the issues that you may want to think about. (This guidance is with respect to transactions entered into under the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement, and capitalized terms used herein are defined in that agreement.