Introduction

For all of the legal difficulties which market participants are facing in light of the insolvency of Lehman Brothers, the insolvency is providing the Courts with the opportunity to pass judgment on many of the tricky provisions of the 1992 and 2002 versions of the ISDA Master Agreement (together the "Agreements").

In Clare Horwood & Others v Land of Leather Limited (In Administration) and Zurich Insurance Plc the Commercial Court was asked to consider in the context of a claim under the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 whether a compromise agreement entered into by an insured without the insurer's specific instructions in writing was in breach of a policy term. Under the compromise agreement, the insured had released a third party from an obligation to indemnify it in respect of various personal injury claims.

In a highly anticipated decision, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the "Court") on June 28, 2016, dismissed Counts I through XIX of Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.'s ("LBSF") fourth amended complaint (the "Complaint") in Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. Bank of America, N.A., et al.1 In doing so, the Court removed the majority of the approximately 250 noteholder, issuer and indenture trustee defendants from the LBSF lawsuit to recover over $1 billion distributed in connection with 44 swap transactions.

2016 is turning out to be a year of significant reform of insurance law. The Insurance Act comes into force on 16 August 2016 and now we know that the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 will finally come into force on 1 August 2016, having been updated by the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Regulations 2016.

This case arose from an underlying claim by a company called Mploy against Denso, which resulted in an adverse costs order against Mploy.

Applying Texas law, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas has held that a primary insurer that "exhausted" its policy limits by agreeing to pay the insured's bankruptcy estate its remaining policy limits, while stipulating that a significant portion of this payment would be returned to the insurer by the estate's bankruptcy trustee, was required to reimburse the excess insurer the value of the returned payments made by the trustee. Yaquinto v. Admiral Ins. Co., Inc. (In re Cool Partners, Inc.), 2010 WL 1779668 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2010).

The Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s ruling that a debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) lender had breached its financing agreement, barring its claim for commitment and funding fees from the DIP. Arlington LF, LLC v. Arlington Hospitality, Inc., No. 09-3560, 2011 WL 727981, *9 (7th Cir. March 3, 2011), aff’g No. 08 C 5098, 2011 WL 3055350 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2009). Although the DIP itself had also breached the agreement, that breach was not, in the court’s view, effective until after the lender had already “walked away.” Id. at *6.

The International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (“ISDA”) is preparing forms of amendment to its boilerplate master agreements in connection with market practice relating to the suspension of payments by a non-defaulting party. ISDA is also considering a protocol to implement the amendments into existing agreements on a multilateral basis.  

The plaintiff, Horng Technical Enterprise Co., LTD (“Horng”), was a Taiwanese corporation that manufactured computer accessories.  Horng Technical Enterprise Co., LTD v. Sakar International, Inc., No. 10-3648 (3d Cir. June 23, 2011).  The defendant, Sakar International, Inc.

Lenders should be aware of a recent Bankruptcy Court decision that barred a lender from obtaining certain costs when it did not comply with a notice requirement in a mortgage.

On June 5, 2014 the United States Bankruptcy Court in In re Demers, BR 13-11539, 2014 WL 2620961 (Bankr. D.R.I. June 5, 2014) ruled that it is inequitable to shift the costs of a creditor’s error in proceeding with the foreclosure process to the debtor when the creditor sent an unspecific and unclear notice and consequently was not entitled to proceed.