Though the shareholders of a corporation did not sign a corporate sale agreement, they were considered to be the sellers of the corporation, and therefore were entitled to avail themselves of the indemnification provisions under the agreement, ruled the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See In re NuNet, Inc., 348 B.R. 300 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006).

In 1991, a decision of the Delaware Chancery Court helped popularize the term "zone of insolvency.”[1] In the intervening 16 years, numerous courts and commentators have cited this decision as standing for the proposition that the directors of a Delaware corporation that is either insolvent or in the zone of insolvency owe fiduciary duties to the creditors, as well as to the shareholders, of the corporation.

The Delaware Supreme Court’s recent decision in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla1 addresses the fiduciary duties of corporate directors in Delaware. In affirming a lower court decision by the Delaware Court of Chancery,2 the Delaware Supreme Court held that creditors of a Delaware corporation that is insolvent or in the “zone of insolvency” have no right to bring direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty against directors.

The importance and practical benefits resulting from the use of the same in-house counsel for an entire corporate family are numerous. For example, the in-house attorneys are particularly familiar with the corporate family’s structure, can assist with joint public filings, and can expertly oversee the corporate family’s compliance with regulatory regimes. If a subsidiary in the corporate family becomes financially distressed, however, the creditors of the financially distressed entity may look to the parent corporation for recourse.

Principles of corporate governance that determine how a company functions outside of bankruptcy are transformed and in some cases abrogated once the company files for chapter 11 protection, when the debtor's board and management act as a "debtor-in-possession" ("DIP") that bears fiduciary obligations to the chapter 11 estate and all stakeholders involved in the bankruptcy case.

On April 9, 2008, the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued its opinion in Miller v. McDonald, et al., 2008 WL 1002035 (Bkrtcy.D.Del.), in which it held that the general counsel of a public company had a duty to implement a system that would provide reasonable monitoring to prevent corporate wrongdoing. The court found that the general counsel’s duty arose from two sources. First, Delaware law imposes a duty on directors and senior officers to implement a system that would provide reasonable monitoring of corporate activity.

Do officers of a public corporation have an affirmative obligation to monitor corporate affairs? Yes, according to Judge Walsh in his recently issued memorandum opinion in Miller v. McDonald (In re World Health Alternatives, Inc.).1 Although "Caremark" oversight liability had previously generally only been imposed on directors of public corporations, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware determined that officers are not immune from such liability as a matter of law.

According to press reports, Tammy Andreycak, a former director of accounting at Le-Nature’s Inc., recently pleaded guilty to multiple fraud charges in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The charges included bank fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy and filing false income-tax returns, all allegedly taking place between 2003 and 2006. Andreycak is the first person to be prosecuted in the fraudulent scheme alleged to have occurred at Le-Nature’s.

For the third time in as many years, the Delaware Chancery Court has handed down an important ruling interpreting the interaction between federal bankruptcy law and Delaware corporate law. The thorny question this time was whether a bankruptcy court’s determination that the directors of a corporation acted in good faith when they authorized a chapter 11 filing precluded a subsequent claim that the directors breached their fiduciary duties by doing so. The Delaware Chancery Court concluded that it did, ruling in Nelson v.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware on May 30, 2008, issued a memorandum opinion in which it refused to dismiss claims of breach of fiduciary duty against directors and officers of a company who approved the sale of the company’s assets on the eve of its filing for bankruptcy protection. In issuing its opinion inIn re Bridgeport Holdings Inc., the court provided some guidelines for directors and officers, particularly during challenging economic times.