Supreme Court Judgment dated 10 March 2016 (STS 151/2016)

The judgment of the Supreme Court analyses the objective scope of extension of the liability for obligations and debts for which, as appropriate, the director of a company should be liable and, more specifically, the scope of "the corporate obligations subsequent to the occurrence of the legal ground for dissolution".

The Supreme Court confirmed the lower-court judgments that had rescinded the payments made to the managing director through remuneration, as the bylaw requisite to create the right to receive it had not been met, as well as payments made to shareholders through dividends, differentiating between the resolution of the meeting to distribute dividends and the payment of these dividends.

The facts are as follows: an insolvency creditor challenged the decision of the administrator in bankruptcy of a company about not recognizing its credit. The credit derived from a guarantee granted to secure a promissory note from a company belonging to the group of the insolvent company.

The Supreme Court rules in a recent decision over different bankruptcy incidents. The first relates to a work contract to supply materials in which a penalty clause for late work is established, and the ability to execute the works under the guarantee provided in the contract if the contractor may not execute them. Having a delay in delivery of the work and having entrusted to another company the repair works, the owner claimed the payment of the amounts and compensation with the guarantee held.

Financial institutions are not de facto directors of the insolvent company because they do not significantly affect the performance of the insolvent company’s activity, but only ensure that  certain costs do not affect the repayment of their loan.

Madrid Commercial Court No. 6 order of October 7, 2013: acquirer of a production unit subrogated in employment liabilities because the shareholders and directors had established the company specifically to acquire the insolvent company ("Marco Aldany Case")

The court did not rule out liability for employment obligations because the partners - directors of the insolvent company wished to acquire the production unit through a company created specifically to acquire it.

A credit institution that is the indirect owner of an insolvent company’s share capital is not a person closely related to the insolvent company, unless it uses an intermediary to avoid that status.

If severe losses and insolvency occur, the directors’ duty to seek wind -up no longer applies if the company files for insolvency and is declared insolvent. While the composition is being carried out, the duty to seek wind-up and the directors’ resulting liability will not arise.

This ruling clarifies the role of the directors’ corporate duties in the event that legal grounds can be attributed to the company for wind-up due to losses, and the obligation to file for insolvency if the company becomes insolvent.

The ruling called for rescission of previously agreed valuations to divide a company’s assets into two portions in a process for total spin-off in favour of two pre-existing companies. One of the beneficiaries was ordered to refund the other beneficiary company (undergoing insolvency proceedings) the excess valuation the former h ad received during the total spin-off.

In 2011, the Spanish legislator introduced the court-sanctioned refinancing agreement (‘Spanish Scheme’) in the Spanish insolvency system. While the introduction of the Spanish Scheme has been praised for providing new tools for debtors to reorganise out-of-court while addressing the collective action problem, certain of its provisions have made this instrument too rigid and, thus, ineffective for tackling Spanish restructurings.