The Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in Saulnier v. Royal Bank of Canada on October 24, 2008. The decision provides welcome clarification concerning the nature of government licenses and confirms that at least certain kinds of licenses constitute property for the purposes of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the “BIA”) and for the purposes of Canadian personal property security legislation. The decision is also important because it takes a purposive and commercial approach to the interpretation of bankruptcy and personal property security legislation.

In Re Norame Inc. (2008), 90 O.R. (3d) 303(Ont. C.A.), the Ontario Court of Appeal was again called upon to consider various issues of importance to insolvency practitioners. In a decision released on April 28, 2008, Mr. Justice LaForme delivered the judgment for the Court of Appeal and in so doing dismissed the appeal of Paddon + Yorke Inc., in its capacity as trustee in bankruptcy of Norame Inc. (the "Trustee").

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the Court), has held that section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits a swap counterparty from setting off amounts owed to the debtor against amounts owed by the debtor to affiliates of the counterparty, notwithstanding the safe harbor provision in section 561 of the Bankruptcy Code and language in the ISDA Master Agreement permitting the swap counterparty to effect “triangular” setoffs. In re Lehman Brothers Inc., Case No. 08-01420 (JMP)(SIPA) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. October 4, 2011).

Following a recent ruling of the Ontario Court of Appeal, parties may need to proceed cautiously in enforcing contractual rights and remedies in circumstances where there is a risk of the counterparty subsequently becoming insolvent.

The common law has long recognized that a contractual provision which is explicitly and directly triggered by a party’s insolvency (and which thereby causes subsequent prejudice to the rights of the insolvent party’s creditors) may be unenforceable as a matter of public policy.

Plenty of ink has been spilled about how to apply the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall and the line of cases in which it sits. It is a challenging body of law for many reasons, but perhaps the most difficult reason is that the Court indicated that the scope of power that bankruptcy courts may be given today must be defined by reference to beliefs about the scope of judicial and other governmental powers at the time of the country’s founding, when divisions of governmental power were embedded in the U.S. Constitution.

A decision from the United States Supreme Court penned by Justice Sonia Sotomayor adopted a broad reading of “actual fraud” in section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, which excepts from discharge debts “obtained by . . .

On Monday 14 December 2009 the Dubai Financial Support Fund received a further US$10bn from the Abu Dhabi Government to be used to satisfy a series of upcoming obligations of Dubai World and its subsidiaries (“DWG”). The monies were used in part to pay off the Nakheel sukuk which matured on the same day. The markets in the region (and elsewhere) reacted positively with significant gains and Dubai's CDS spreads narrowed. That same afternoon the Dubai Government announced a new law (Decree No. 57). Sheikh Ahmad Bin Saeed Al Maktoum, Chairman of the Dubai Supreme Fiscal Committee, said: