The United States Supreme Court recently ruled in Stern v. Marshall1 that a bankruptcy court lacks constitutional authority to render a final judgment on a bankruptcy estate’s counterclaim against a creditor based on state common law, despite an express statutory grant of jurisdiction. This ruling is the most significant decision regarding bankruptcy court jurisdiction since the Court’s 1982 decision in Northern Pipeline v. Marathon2 and it could significantly affect the administration of bankruptcy cases.
Root of the Constitutional Problem
Key points
The court has held that a statutory demand is valid despite the high default interest rate on an underlying loan.
On Monday, May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court issued its decision in the case of Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, — S. Ct. —, 2016 WL 2842452 (2016) resolving a split between the Fifth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeal regarding the scope of the “actual fraud” exception to an individual debtor’s bankruptcy discharge. In relevant part, Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits debtors from discharging “any debt . . . for money, property, [or] services . . . to the extent obtained, by . . .
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S4 of the PPSA, provides that "except as otherwise provided" in the PPSA, the PPSA does not apply to a number of enumerated liens, charges or other interests, including as set out in s4(a) "a lien, charge or other interest given by an Act or rule of law in force in Alberta".
In recent years, manufacturers and lessors of heavy industrial equipment have installed sophisticated systems into their units which require a computer code be entered in order for the equipment to operate. This computer code may need to be updated or changed periodically. If the purchaser or lessee is in arrears in making payment to the manufacturer or lessor, the manufacturer or lessor may refuse to supply the debtor with the new access code. In effect, the manufacturer or lessor has the ability to remotely render the equipment unusable.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the "District Court") on March 29, 2012 held that a bankruptcy court sale order issued under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code ("Section 363") could not extinguish state law successor liability personal injury claims brought against the purchaser by third parties injured after the close of the bankruptcy case, but whose injuries arose out of conduct of the debtor prior to its bankruptcy. Morgan Olson LLC v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Industries, Inc.), 2012 WL 1038672 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
The United States Supreme Court recently narrowed the scope of the authority of bankruptcy courts, with potential far-reaching implications on past, present and future bankruptcy matters. The case, Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (2011), began as a dispute between Anna Nicole Smith and the son of her late husband. After several years of litigation and one previous trip to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court ruled bankruptcy courts lack the authority to enter judgments on counterclaims against a debtor that are based on state law.
It is common practice to find directors of a company standing surety for the company in order to secure its debts. The consequence could be severe for the sureties, because if the company is unable to pay its debt, the creditor can take legal action against the directors or other third parties in their capacity as sureties, unless the company pays its debts and the sureties are released from liability.
In a corporate reorganization under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”), the design of appropriate classes of creditors can be central to the success of the restructuring initiative. The requisite “double majority” for a plan of arrangement to be approved, being a majority in number and two thirds by value of support from creditors, is required per class in order to be binding on that class.