In two recent decisions, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has interpreted narrowly certain of the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions.
On January 25, 2010, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that provisions in a CDO indenture subordinating payments due to Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc., as swap provider, constituted unenforceable ipso facto clauses under the facts and circumstances of this case. The Court also held that, because the payment priority provisions were not contained in the four corners of a swap agreement, the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor protections, which generally permit the operation of ipso facto clauses, did not apply.
On Dec. 21, 2011, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey approved a liquidation plan for collateralized-debt obligation issuer (“CDO”) Zais Investment Grade Limited VII (“ZING VII”). The plan incorporates a settlement between senior noteholders who had initiated the bankruptcy case by filing an involuntary petition against the CDO, and junior noteholders who were appealing the Bankruptcy Court’s April 26, 2011 order granting the involuntary petition.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey recently held that a Cayman Islands collateralized-debt obligation issuer (“CDO”) could be a debtor under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) and declined to dismiss an involuntary case commenced against the CDO by certain noteholders on the grounds that the notes held by such noteholders were “non-recourse” notes. Below is a discussion of the court’s decision and its potential implications. The decision is currently being appealed.
On Jan. 25, 2010, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”) held that a trust deed provision reversing a priority of payment waterfall upon the bankruptcy of a credit support provider under a swap agreement is unenforceable under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”).
In the recent decision of Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Assoc. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), 2016 WL 3621180 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2016), the U.S.
On Monday, the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) released a report entitled “Factors Affecting Efforts to Limit Payments to AIG Counterparties.” The report examines certain transactions related to the rescue of AIG, including the creation of Maiden Lane III, a limited liability company formed last year to facilitate the purchase of assets from counterparties of AIG Financia
In a recent decision that will be of interest to capital and structured finance market participants,1 a bankruptcy court in the Southern District of New York found that nonrecourse noteholders of a structured finance vehicle were not eligible petitioners under § 303(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and therefore could not commence an involuntary bankruptcy case.
In re Zais Investment Grade Ltd. VII1 is the latest in a recent line of bankruptcy cases challenging bedrock assumptions regarding securitization special purpose entities (SPEs) and bankruptcy considerations in securitization transactions.2 Zais establishes precedent allowing a senior noteholder of a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) to place the CDO issuer in an involuntary chapter 11 bankruptcy in order to advance an asset management plan that would otherwise require supermajority approval of all noteholders (including all junior classes) under the related indenture.
On January 25, Judge Peck of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York entered a declaratory judgment in favor of Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (LBSF) in a case examining a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction and concerning the effect of event of default provisions on the payment priorities of LBSF as swap counterparty under certain swap agreements and the holders of certain credit-linked synthetic portfolio notes. The payment waterfalls (Priority Provisions) of most CDO transactions give priority to swap counterparties over noteholders.