Creditors have recently made some headway in collecting the full amount to which they are contractually entitled pursuant to various debt instruments. In In re Calpine Corp.,1 reported in our summer 2007 newsletter, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York permitted a secured creditor to collect damages (albeit in the form of an unsecured claim) caused by dashed expectations due to the early repayment of its debt.

In a recent decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “U.S. Court”) exercised its abstention powers and dismissed an involuntary chapter 11 petition filed against an Argentine company, Compania de Alimentos Fargo, SA (“Fargo”).1 Fargo, a debtor in an insolvency proceeding in Argentina, had moved to dismiss the involuntary petition principally because its Argentine bankruptcy case was still pending.

Late last year, government responses to the subprime mortgage crisis proliferated but most attention focused on those measures that could be, and in some cases were, rapidly implemented — measures like the Treasury Department’s urging holders of certain subprime adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) to freeze interest rates temporarily or the Federal Reserve’s proposed tightening of lending requirements.

In UPS Capital Business Credit v. Gencarelli (In re Gencarelli),1 the First Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether a secured creditor is entitled to collect a prepayment penalty from a solvent debtor. The Court found that the secured creditor could collect the penalty, whether or not it is reasonable, so long as the penalty is enforceable under state law. The Court reasoned that any other holding would leave open the possibility that an unsecured creditor could recover more from a solvent estate than a secured creditor.

Background

The next time you negotiate a settlement payment with a financially troubled party, you may want to keep in mind an ancient term related to livestock herding: earmarking. The concept may be somewhat antiquated, but the Second Circuit has recently confirmed that it is still viable – and can help you keep the settlement payment if the other party later files for bankruptcy.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has held that a severance payment made to an executive who worked for both Enron Corp. (“Enron”) and various affiliates of Enron prior to Enron’s filing for bankruptcy was a preferential transfer that could be avoided by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”).1 In reaching this conclusion, the Bankruptcy Court rejected the argument that the severance payment was an “ordinary course” transaction that was protected from avoidance.

A recent decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York underscores the risk to junior creditors of not understanding fully the scope of consent given to a senior creditor to modify its senior lending arrangements with a debtor under the terms of an intercreditor agreement. In Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc. v.

Congress enacted amendments to the United States Bankruptcy Code in 2005 designed to increase certainty in the marketplace for mortgage loan repurchase agreements and other financial contracts.1 The contours – and limits – of these amendments were recently explored by the Delaware bankruptcy court in Calyon New York Branch v. American Home Mortgage Corp.

In the January 2008 issue, we reported on In re Solutia, Inc.,1 decided by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. The Solutia court demonstrated how contractual entitlements of debt instruments may be altered in bankruptcy. There, the original issue discount of certain secured notes was found to be interest, rather than principal, causing a significant portion of the noteholders’ claims to be disallowed. In In re Urban Communicators PCS, Ltd.

In a recent adversary proceeding brought by a chapter 7 trustee to recharacterize a creditor’s claim from a debt claim to an equity interest, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of South Carolina denied a creditor’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim where the trustee had alleged that the lender assumed control over the corporation after the date of the credit agreement.