In Perpetual Trustee Company Limited v Downey & Black, the High Court discussed the effect of the liquidation process on a choice of forum clause in a commercial contract.  It found that as the subject company, HIH, had been placed into liquidation, the choice of forum clause between HIH and Perpetual (which designated the New South Wales Courts as the forum for resolution of disputes) did not automatically operate.  Instead, the question became whether the New Zealand or NSW courts were the more appropriate venue.

In the recent decision in Taylor v Official Assignee, the Court of Appeal overturned the High Court's dismissal of Mrs Taylor's appeal against the Official Assignee's decisions to set aside dispositions by Mrs Taylor to her family trust prior to her bankruptcy.

Mr and Mrs Taylor settled the family trust in October 2000.  The dispositions in question occurred between December 2000 and January 2007.  Mrs Taylor was adjudicated bankrupt in November 2006.

In Fenland District Council v Sheppard and others, FDC had spent £72,000 making a derelict property safe, which by the hearing date was worth less than half that amount. FDC registered the property improvements as an interest in the property, (indisputably) in priority to the prior mortgagee.

When the property's owner was adjudicated bankrupt, the bankrupt's trustee disclaimed the property (under a provision similar to section 117 of the NZ Insolvency Act). FDC sought to have the property vested in it, on the condition that the mortgagee's charge be removed.

In our October update, we reported on the Court of Appeal decision in Grant v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (see here).  The Supreme Court has now declined leave to appeal from that decision.

InThe Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Blackmore Trust Ltd, Blackmore tried to stave off liquidation for the sum of $1.4 million owed to the IRD.  After six or seven adjournments, Blackmore finally put evidence before the Court (albeit through its lawyer, rather than by affidavit) claiming that its liabilities totalled $15.6 million, and its sole asset, the James Smith building in the Wellington CBD, was valued at $21.5 million as a going concern, or $11 million - $13 million in a "fire sale".

In our October 2010 insolvency legal update, we reviewed the case of South Canterbury Finance Ltd v Nielsen, where the Court found in favour of second mortgagee, SCF, on the interpretation of a deed of priority.  That case was appealed successfully to the Court of Appeal by the first mortgagee, ASB.  This update provides a brief review of the Court of Appeal's reasoning.

In Official Assignee v Spencer, Mr Spencer's bankruptcy period was extended from three to six years due to his conduct and failure to comply with his obligations under the Insolvency Act 1967 (Act). 

Mr Spencer was adjudicated bankrupt for the second time in August 2007 and was due to be discharged from bankruptcy in 2010.  However, the Official Assignee objected to Mr Spencer's discharge and asked the Court to exercise its discretion and decline to order the discharge.

In Grant v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, the Court of Appeal took little time to uphold a High Court decision that a deed of company arrangement (DOCA) under Part 15A of the Companies Act 1993 was void.

At the creditors meeting, the DOCA had been approved by the majority of creditors in number. Nevertheless, this did not constitute 75% of creditors in value. Mr Grant, as chair of a creditors' meeting, purported to exercise a casting vote in favour of the DOCA in order for it to be approved. 

Managh v Morrison and Ors involved an application by a liquidator to set aside a transaction pursuant to section 292 of the Companies Act 1993.  Approximately one year before liquidation the company assigned causes of action against a firm of solicitors and a real estate agent to a trust associated with the company's director.

In Capital + Merchant Finance Limited (in receivership) v Vision Securities Limited (in receivership) our Wellington commercial litigation team was successful in the Court of Appeal on a defendant's summary judgment application involving the interpretation of a subordination clause in a Security Trust Deed (Deed).