In Day v The Official Assignee as Liquidator of GN Networks Ltd (in Liq) [2016] NZHC 2400, the High Court rejected a claim that the funding arrangement at issue constituted maintenance or champerty.

In our June 2015 update we reported on the Court of Appeal decision in which Mr Gilbert was held personally liable for body corporate levies, as a receiver of QSM Trustees Limited (QSMTL).  QSMTL owned units in a unit title complex.  The Body Corporate sought to exercise its statutory power and impose levies on Mr Gilbert personally, as receiver of QSMTL. 

For the first time in New Zealand, the High Court has considered whether a compromise under Part 14 of the Companies Act 1993 can release guarantors of a company's debts.  Silverfern proposed a Part 14 compromise to its creditors and, as part of that compromise, the guarantees given by Silverfern's directors and shareholders, Mr and Mrs O'Connor, of Silverfern's debts, would be unconditionally released.  The compromise was approved by the required majority but opposed by the plaintiffs. 

The applicants in Closegate Hotel Development (Durham) Limited & Anor v McLean & Ors [2013] EWHC 3237 (Ch) were companies that had borrowed money off Barclays Bank to finance a hotel venture.  That funding was secured by floating charges granted by the companies.

On 25 July 2013 the Court of Appeal issued its final judgment in Farrell v Fences & Kerbs Limited [2013] NZCA 329. The final judgment related to three conjoined appeals in which an interim judgment had been delivered on 27 March 2013 (Farrell v Fences & Kerbs Limited [2013] 3 NZLR 82). The interim judgment held that to rely on the defence to setting aside a voidable transaction in section 296(3)(c) of the Companies Act 1993 "new value" was required to be given at the time the payment that is sought to be set aside was made.

In the recent UK case of Williams v Glover & Anor, the Court considered the novel issue of whether the right to appeal against a tax liability constitutes the "property" of a company in liquidation, in deciding whether such a right was assignable or not. In that case, the applicant liquidator sought directions as to whether it could assign the right to appeal against an assessment of tax liability to the respondent former directors of the company in liquidation. Judge Pelling QC held that while there were authorities that had considered this point, they were not binding.

In Rabson v Croad [2013] NZSC 3, the Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Rabson's appeal of a High Court order pursuant to section 301 of the Companies Act 1993 (Act) that he reimburse $58,084.31 to a company in liquidation of which he had been a director.  Mr Rabson sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court to challenge the Court of Appeal's substantive determination on the basis that (among other things) the High Court failed to comply with section 301 of the Act which confers on the Court the power, in the course of a liquidation, to inquire into the conduct of certain persons a

Earlier last month, the UK High Court held that administrators appointed under the Investment Bank Special Administration Regulations 2011 (UK) are not officers analogous to liquidators.

The ruling arose from an application for directions made by investment bank administrators (IBAs) on the issue of whether their appointment was analogous to the appointment of a liquidator. Had the Court held in the affirmative, their appointment would have constituted an event of default by the company in administration under the terms of a global master repurchase agreement.

In the case of Southbury Insurance Ltd v Black, Messrs Downey and Black, the receivers of South Canterbury Finance (SCF) successfully sought permission from the Court to be appointed liquidators of Southbury Insurance Limited (Southbury) despite being disqualified under section 280(1) of the Companies Act 1993 (the Act).

In Fenland District Council v Sheppard and others, FDC had spent £72,000 making a derelict property safe, which by the hearing date was worth less than half that amount. FDC registered the property improvements as an interest in the property, (indisputably) in priority to the prior mortgagee.

When the property's owner was adjudicated bankrupt, the bankrupt's trustee disclaimed the property (under a provision similar to section 117 of the NZ Insolvency Act). FDC sought to have the property vested in it, on the condition that the mortgagee's charge be removed.