Over the past five years, courts have issued rulings of potential concern to buyers of distressed debt. Courts have addressed, among other things, “loan to own” acquisition strategies resulting in vote designation; equitable subordination, disallowance, and other lender liability exposure based upon the claim seller’s misconduct; disclosure requirements for ad hoc committees of debtholders; the adequacy of standardized claims-trading agreements; and claim-filing requirements in the era of computerized records.

President Barack Obama gave his imprimatur to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 on July 21. Relatively few of the provisions in the new law implicate the Bankruptcy Code. However, among other things, the law does call on the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, in consultation with the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (the "Administrative Office"), to conduct two bankruptcy-related studies.

As a general rule, absent an express agreement to the contrary, expenses associated with administering the bankruptcy estate, including pledged assets, are not chargeable to a secured creditor’s collateral or claim but must be paid out of the estate’s unencumbered assets. Recognizing, however, that the bankruptcy estate may be called upon to bear significant expense in connection with preserving or disposing of encumbered assets as part of an overall reorganization (or liquidation) strategy, U.S.

The aggregate value of private-equity acquisitions worldwide in 2006 exceeded $660 billion. If this number seems mind-boggling, consider that this record-breaking volume of transactions appears well on the way to being eclipsed in 2007. Even with corporate financing for leveraged buyouts harder to come by as a consequence of the sub-prime mortgage fallout, there is, by some estimates, $300 billion sitting globally in private-equity funds. Already on tap or completed in 2007: a $32 billion takeover of energy company TXU Corp.

Chapter 11 debtors and sophisticated creditor and/or shareholder constituencies are increasingly using postpetition plan support agreements (sometimes referred to as “lockup” agreements) to set forth prenegotiated terms of a chapter 11 plan prior to the filing of a disclosure statement and a plan with the bankruptcy court. Under such lockup agreements, if the debtor ultimately proposes a chapter 11 plan that includes prenegotiated terms, signatories are typically obligated to vote in favor of the plan.

Postconfirmation liquidation and litigation trusts have become an important mechanism in a chapter 11 bankruptcy estate’s arsenal, allowing for the resolution of claims and interests without needlessly delaying confirmation in the interim. The specter of postconfirmation litigation may seem unremarkable. Section 1123(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code states that a plan may provide for retention or enforcement by the reorganized debtor, the trustee, or a representative of the estate of any claim or interest belonging to the estate.

The enduring impact of the Great Recession on businesses, individuals, municipalities, and even sovereign nations has figured prominently in world headlines during the last three years. Comparatively absent from the lede, however, has been the plight of charitable and other nonprofit entities that depend in large part on the largesse of donors who themselves have been less able or less willing to provide eleemosynary institutions with badly needed sources of capital in the current economic climate.

The Bankruptcy Code treats insiders with increased scrutiny, from longer preference periods to rigorous equitable subordination principles, denial of chapter 7 trustee voting rights, disqualification in some cases of votes on a cram-down chapter 11 plan, and restrictions on postpetition key-employee compensation packages. The treatment of claims by insiders for prebankruptcy services is no exception to this general policy: section 502(b)(4) disallows insider claims for services to the extent the claim exceeds the "reasonable value" of such services.

The failed bid of liquidators for two hedge funds affiliated with defunct investment firm Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., to obtain recognition of the funds’ Cayman Islands winding-up proceedings under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code was featured prominently in business headlines during the late summer and fall of 2007.

In previous editions of the Business Restructuring Review, we reported on a pair of highly controversial rulings handed down in late 2005 and early 2006 by the New York bankruptcy court overseeing the chapter 11 cases of embattled energy broker Enron Corporation and its affiliates. In the first, Bankruptcy Judge Arthur J. Gonzalez held that a claim is subject to equitable subordination under section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code even if it is assigned to a third-party transferee who was not involved in any misconduct committed by the original holder of the debt.