Recently, a Delaware bankruptcy court denied a purchaser of claims its recovery because of judgments against the original holders of the claims from whom the claims were purchased. The case,In re KB Toys, Inc., et al., 470 B.R. 331 (Bankr. D. Del.

An issue of potential concern for any licensee of intellectual property is the possibility of losing that license if its licensor files for bankruptcy protection. For a bankrupt licensor, its intellectual property may be a significant asset that could be sold or otherwise licensed as part of a dissolution or restructuring. But any license on such intellectual property essentially acts as an encumberance on that property that may reduce the value of the asset to a potential purchaser.

The ISDA Master Agreement¹ serves as the basis for the vast majority of overthe- counter derivatives transactions. Two fundamental principles of the ISDA Master Agreement are: (1) upon the default of one party to a swap, the nondefaulting counterparty may terminate the swap, calculate its loss and claim damages; and (2) the obligation of each party to a swap to make payments to the other is subject to the satisfaction of the conditions precedent that no default has occurred with respect to the other party.

Participants in the multibillion-dollar market for distressed claims and securities have had ample reason to keep a watchful eye on developments in the bankruptcy courts during the last decade. That vigil appeared to have been over five years ago, after a federal district court ruled in the Enron chapter 11 cases that sold claims are generally not subject to equitable subordination or disallowance on the basis of the seller's misconduct or receipt of a voidable transfer. A ruling recently handed down by a Delaware bankruptcy court, however, has reignited the debate.

As the seventh anniversary of the enactment of chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code draws near, the volume of chapter 15 cases commenced in U.S. bankruptcy courts on behalf of foreign debtors has increased rapidly. During that period, there has also (understandably) been a marked uptick in litigation concerning various aspects of the comparatively new legislative regime governing cross-border bankruptcy cases patterned on the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. One such issue was the subject of a ruling recently handed down by a Texas district court. In In re Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V., 470 B.R.

The Bankruptcy Code in the United States is generally intended to give honest but unfortunate debtors the opportunity for a fresh start. This includes the honest but unfortunate franchisee who attempts to start a franchise but ultimately fails. Generally, if a franchisee files a personal bankruptcy case, the personal liability of the individual who filed bankruptcy is discharged and that individual has the opportunity for a fresh start.

Every lender sincerely hopes that, even when its borrower is flat on the floor and seems down for the proverbial count, the borrower will still find the wherewithal to repay it. A lender often starts counting the days after it is repaid until the 90-day preference period (11 U.S.C. §547) has passed. The lender generally breathes a sigh of relief on the 91st day, confident that if its borrower files for bankruptcy, the money paid to the lender is safe from being clawed back by the Bankruptcy Court.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, applying federal law, has held that a Liquidation Trustee and a Litigation Trustee (the Trustees) did not have standing to object to the disbursal of policy proceeds in an insurer’s interpleader action because they had no existing claims or realistic potential claims for coverage under the policy. Federal Insurance Co. v. DBSI, Inc., 2012 WL 2501090 (Bankr. D. Del. June 27, 2012).

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that the rejection of a trademark license by the trustee did not abrogate the licensee’s rights under a prepetition agreement to use the debtor’s trademark. Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, __F.3d __, 2012 WL 2687939 (7th Cir. July 9, 2012). The Seventh Circuit decision is contrary to a prior decision by the Fourth Circuit in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985).

In Schwartz-Tallard v. America's Servincing Co.